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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine some stative 
verbs, i.e. verbs which do not normally take progressive aspect, 
from a syntactic and a philosophical point of view. An 
examination of the concept of causation and its relation to 
transitivity is also undertaken in order to try and show that 
stative verbs are "resultatives." Formulation of the 
argument leads to the positing of a linguistic model that is 
an extension though in some ways a fundamental alteration of 
Fillmore's case model. This model allows room for the 
philosophic insights of Austin & Urmson.
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation owes its origin, in part, to an interest In 
the fact that linguists and philosophers were sometimes particularly 
concerned in analysing the same lexical items for different reasons. 
Verbs such as 'know,' 'think,' 'promise,' 'order' etc. are obviously 
of interest to the philosopher. However, these verbs were, also, 
often included among the list of verbs that linguists noted were 
incapable of taking, or at least reluctant to take, progressive aspect, 
under certain conditions. Moreover, in some fairly recent works the 
above syntactic fact has actually been used by linguistic philosophers 
as a way of delimiting a class of verbs that they wished to submit to 
conceptual analysis. Similarly linguists and grammarians, after noting 
various syntactic facts about these verbs, have almost invariably tried 
to group them semantically, and to give what can only be called 
philosophic reasons as to why these verbs cannot take progressive aspect. 
A good opportunity seemed to present itself, therefore, for a comparison 
of the way in v/hich the same body of data was treated by two different 
but related disciplines.
Furthermore, as a person involved in teaching English to people 
of many different nationalities, it is difficult not to become involved 
in trying to solve one of the most intractable problems for teachers 
and foreign learners of English; when progressive aspect can be used, 
and, perhaps even mofe importantly, when it cannot be used.
A third stimulus for the writing of this paper came from the 
discovery of the fact that the concepts of cause and change were being
3*
used by linguists, not only to explain certain syntactic phenomena, but 
also to relate what had appeared, hitherto, to be completely unrelated 
verbs, such as * give* and 'have,1 1 shov/* and see, etc.
This has led to an attempt to incorporate the concepts of* cause 
and change into a linguistic theory, and to relate the syntactic fact 
of stativity and the insights of some philosophers to that theory.
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PART 1
STATIVTTY AM) PROGRESSIVE ASPECT
CHAPTER- 1
Lakoff on stative verbs and adjectives
Evidence
A thought provoking recent work on the group of verbs in English 
that are resistant to expansion with be + ing is the above mentioned 
work by Lakoff.
Stative verbs differ from non-stative verbs in that they not only 
appear in such constructions as
1)* He is knowing the answer
cf 2) He is learning irregular verbs.But that they also cannot
appear in other constructions where non-stative verbs are typically 
found. Examples of these constructions are:-
a) true imperatives
3)* Know the answer
cf A) Learn irregular verbs
b) with “do something*1 -pro-forms
5,)* What I did was know the answer 
cf 6) What 1 did was learn irregular verbs
c) with !tdo so" pro-forms
7 I knew the answer and John did so too 
cf 8} I learnt irregular verbs and John did so too.
&) nor can they appear in embedded sentences after such verbs 
as remind tell ask etc.
9^ * I asked him to know the answer.1
10) I asked him to learn irregular verbs.
He also points out that some adjectives are unusual in that they 
can appear in similar constructions to 2) A) 6) and 10) above (though 
not 8)) in association with the progressive form of the copula.
11) He is being honest*
12) Be honest.
6.
13*) What I did was to be honest*
1^ .) 1 asked him to be honest*
Conclusions*
Lakoff draws two conclusions from his analysis, one syntactic, 
and one semantic. The syntactic conclusion is that the concept of 
markeciness/non-markedness be introduced into transformational theory to 
reflect the fact that while most adjectives are stative and most verbs 
non-stative, certain marked members of each class will be non-stative 
and stative respectively. The progressive - transformation, imperative 
transformation can then be allowed to operate only on unmarked verbs and 
marked adjectives. He maintains also that this implies that the 
stative/non-stative distinction is logically prior to the distinction 
between verbs and adjectives and that an ultimate identity between verb 
and adjective must be posited in deep structure.
The semantic conclusion is that the grammatical distinction 
"partially reflects a semantic distinction. In an overwhelming number 
of cases stative verbs and adjectives have the semantic property 
non-activity and non-stative verbs and adjectives the semantic property 
activity." (ppt.11-12). He admits however that non-stative adjectives 
seem to be interpretable as either active or non-active as in the 
following sentences
15.) John is being foolish (active)
16.) John is foolish (non-active),
Moreover, there are cases of verbs that are semantically non-active 
and syntactically non-stative such as "remain, stay, keep, sit, stand, 
huddle, squat" (p.13). He states categorically, however, that there 
are no verbs that are semantically active and syntactically stative.
7.
Comment*
Implicit in Lakoff*s presentation is the close connection between 
non-stative verbs and adjectives and implied questions with the 
”pro~verb” ’do’, Lyons (1966) makes essentially the same point.
’’Unlike most 1 verbs* (which we will call ‘verbs of action1) 
stative verbs such as *know* ‘believe* ’exist* etc# cannot normally be 
used in answer to questions containing 1 do* as the ’predicator* (e.g. what 
did he do ?)# It is important to distinguish two different functions of
*do* both exemplified in this sentence# The ’do* which carries tense
under certain transformations is not restricted to verbs of action#” 
(pp.222-223).
This close relationship between the typical unmarked non-stative 
verb and the pro-verb * do* seems to lie behind Lakoff* s semantic 
proposal, To say that typical cerbs ’have the semantic property 
activity” is very similar to the traditional definition of a verb as a 
"doing word” and both definitions presumably owe their existence to the 
fact that most verbs can be used in answer to such questions as
17#) What are you doing ?
and in association with *do* in sentences similar to 6) and 8) above#
Yfhat was not traditionally recognised, however, was that certain 
adjectives could be used in answer to questions such as 17) and in 
association with 'do* in sentences similar to 13) and Ilf)#
Criticism#
l) I propose restricting the term stative verb to those verbs that 
are not normally expandable with be + ing# (We shall henceforth say 
verbs that do not take progressive aspect for the sake of brevity and 
familiarity)# This restriction is necessary in view of the fact that 
the class of verbs that does not take progressive aspect does not 
coincide with the class of verbs that does not commute with the pro-verb
*doJ though there is a distinct and significant overlap. Put more
8.
accurately the class; of stative verbs is a subset of the class, of 
(- do) verbs, or alternatively some (- do) verbs can take progressive 
aspect*
Seuren (19&9 PP* 80-82) uses arguments similar to those outlined 
above "to adduce grammatical evidence that most verbs have a common- 
semantic feature 1 do1"* Among the counter-examples he considers, 
however, are verbs such as receive and suffer* But, while these vei-bs, 
as Seuren points out, do not commute with Mo’, i.e* 18) and 19) are 
unacceptable.
18)* What he did was receive blows to the head,
19)* What they did was suffer a defeat
they are clearly not stative, i.e* 20) and 21) are acceptable*
20) He is receiving blows to the head*
21) Our team is suffering a defeat*
Jacobs and Rosenbaum (1968) are clearly aware of the same problem. 
In their analysis of the constituents of a sentence they say (pp. 71-72):-
"The notion-:"doer of an action" of being an agent is not generally 
explained by the notion deep subject of a sentence v— —  For example, 
in the sentence,
John underwent surgery at the hands of Dr. Jones 
it is clear that the doer of the action is not John but Dr. Jones."
This point can be alternatively expressed in terms of the above 
argument by saying that 22) is unacceptable,
22)* What John did was undergo surgery at the hands of 
Dr, Jones.
Though here again 23) is acceptable,
23) John is undergoing surgery at the hands o f Dr, Jones.
Thus, although it must be admitted that (- do) non-stative verbs
are rare (indeed it is difficult to add to the above mentioned three) 
their existence means that we cannot assume that the class of stative
9.
verbs and the class of (- do) verbs are co-extensive.
2) Lakoff suggests that individual verbs and adjectives should be 
marked as * stative andl - stative respectively, i.e. where they are 
exceptional in their class* He points out, however, (footnote p*12) 
that "adjectives like careful, fair, foolish, polite, nasty, etc. seem 
to be interpretable as both ACTIVE and NON-ACTIVE, Compare
John is being foolish
and
John is foolish."
Though he merely notes this and admits that he does "not claim 
to understand it," it is clearly a fact in need of explanation, 
especially as essentially the same situation holds for verbs* Coup are 
2k) a)* I am thinking that Sidney is a liar
but b) I think that Sidney is a liar 
and c) I am thinking about Sidney 
Compare? also
25) a)* He is weighing 60* kilos 
but b) He weighs 60 kilos
and c) He is weighing his daughter.
3) It is, moreover, doubtful whether the copula and non-stative 
adjectives answer questions with the pro-form 1 do* as fully as non- 
stative verbs. Consider the situation where in answer to A1 s question,
26) What did John do ?
B gave the answer
27) He was foolish.
Or in answer to the question,
28) What is john doing ? 
he gave the answer
29) He is being foolish*
In both instances B is likely to feel cheated of the full answer to
10.
which his question entitled him* In both cases B has characterised 
John* s behaviour rather than reported on John* s activity or activities, 
and in normal circumstances A might very well follow up B* s answer with 
a further question, e.g.
Yes but how ? I mean what is he doing foolishly*
A) Finally, though Lakoff* s account of imperatives seems 
essentially correct there are occasions in which stative verbs can be 
used in imperative constructions, e*g.
The fact that the relationship between subject and object can 
sometimes be characterised as a doing relationship and sometimes not 
leads us to two conclusions
one* There are at least tvm notions of a subject of a sentence. As 
Seuren says (op cit p^ *82) "an approximate semantic characterisation of —  
the relational constituent subject —  would consist in the specification 
of who or what is or does*”
characteristics of the verb* The relationship of receive to the 
subject is the same irrespective of gender deixis index, etc* in the 
sentences
Believe that I*m trying to help you*
Imagine that he* s your friend*
Rejoice that my son has returned
a) that the notion subject of a sentence is not a simple
b) That this relationship is dependent upon the semantic
John )
received a present.
I )
etc.
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Although these facts seem obvious enough they are worth stating 
because of what Fillmore (1968) terms the "neglect of the nominative 
in studies of case-uses." However, as he goes on to point out (p.6) 
"There is in principle no reason why the traditional studies of 
case-uses fail to contain such classifications as * nominative of personal 
agent1, * nominative of patient*, 'nominative of beneficiary*, 'nominative 
of affected person*, and 'nominative of interested person* (or, possibly, 
* ethical nominative*) for such sentences as [the following] respectively:
He hit the ball.
He received a blow*
He received a gift.
He loves her.
He has black hair."
CHAPTER 2
Stativity in the Works of Leech and Lyons
An adjectival form of the noun * state1 has been widely used by 
linguists in their treatment of verbs that are reluctant to take 
progressive aspect. As we have seen Lakoff (1966) talks of stative 
verbs and adjectives, as does Lyons (1966) and (1968). Joos (196*1-) 
calls them 1 status verbs' , while Akira Ota (1963) refers to them as 
* statal verbs*. Palmer (1963) calls some of them * state verbs' while 
Leech (1969) makes use of the egression 'state predications*.
However, terms such as stative can be misleading and in this 
section we will devote attention to two writers who seem to have been 
misled by the term.
1) Lyons
Lyons, like Lakoff, accepts the identity of the verb and 
adjective in deep structure for broadly similar reasons as the above 
quotation from his work (p. 7 ) in part illustrates* However, when
discussing the reluctance of stative verbs to talc© progressive aspect, 
he has this to say (1968 p.316).
"Since the most common function of the progressive is to indicate 
duration, one might say that it is only natural for stative verbs not 
to combine with the progressive: the implication of duration is already
contained in these words."
This argument seems wrong in at least three ways. Firstly 
because it simply does not meet linguistic fact. Redundancy and 
ungrammaticality are to be distinguished in language, in that the 
former is not excluded by a grammatical rule.
l) He is chewing with his teeth 
or 2) He kicked the ball with his foot
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are certainly inelegant sentences, but they are not ungrammatical*
Again, although 'here* maybe unnecessary or redundant in the sentence,
3) He is coming here, 
its inclusion or exclusion has no bearing on the grammaticality of the 
sentence.
Secondly there is the group of verbs that Lakoff calls 
semantically non-active and syntactically non-stative (see p. & above)* 
Hot only do these verbs take progressive aspect freely, there is also a 
marked tendency among some of them to favour it especially in 
association with perfective aspect* To me at least
4.) a) I have been living in London for 6 years* 
and b) She has been waiting for 45 minutes, 
are more common than
5) a) X have lived in London for 6 years, 
and b) She has waited for 45 minutes,
when I am still living in London and she is still waiting* While it 
is interesting to note in this connection that the verb lie (in the 
sense of lie down) has almost completely lost its past-participle form 
in the modern language: the perfect progressive form being almost
always used.
Compare
6)(?)She has lain down
with 7) She has been lying down.
Thirdly, it is by no means agreed among linguists that the 
progressive indicates duration. The term "limited duration" would 
meet with much more general agreement. See in this connection, e.g. 
Twaddell (i960 p.8), Joos (op cit £.113), Palmer (op cit p.93)* If 
this is the case and it is the case that duration is "already contained" 
in stative verbs, it is by no means clear why progressive aspect should
1 3^-*
not bo used to limit the duration of the stative verbs, as it appears 
to do in the ease of a verb like ‘live**
Compare
8) He lives in London
and 9) He is living in London*
2) Leech
Leech folio?/s Robert Allen (19&2) and Weinreich (1961) in looking 
for a parallel in verbs or the verb phrase for the [ - Count] distinction 
in nouns. Weinreich states (p.l6l):-
"Ferhaps all languages distinguish between ‘divided* and 
* undivided* reference — , that is between nouns which are quantified in 
the form * some x, a little x, much x* and those that are quantified in 
the form *an x, one x, many x* * —  The distinction also occurs among
non-nouns, for example, divided reference of verbs by means of punctual 
and iterative aspects.1'
Csech will serve as an example of a language where countability 
is grammatically marked in the verb, as can be seen from the following 
sentences where the verb (a verb of motion) is in the imperfective 
aspect:
10) a) Karla jde do Prahy Karla is going to Prague.
b) Karla chodi do Prahy Karla goes to Prague
regularly.
c) Karla chodiva do Prahy Karla occasionally goes
to Prague.
These tenses (or aspects), which only apply to verbs of motion in the 
imperfective aspect, are called the durative iterative and 
frequentative respectively.
Robert Allen (op cit pp.192 ff), to summarise very briefly, 
distinguishes between l) bounded predications (which are analagous to
15*
count nouns) that may "be either unique (like a pen), or repeated 
(like many pens, 2 pens, etc.), and 2) non-bounded predications 
(cf. non-count nouns), which may be public or private* He calls 
these latter suffusive predications by analogy with non-count nouns 
like ‘gas1 or * cheese1, which, no matter how much you divide them, still 
remain gas or cheese. Count nouns are not suffusive, for example a 
pencil divided up will not give one smaller bits of pencil but lead 
or wood. As non-count nouns pervade the space they occupy, so 
suffusive predications pervade time. Bounded predications may take 
progressive aspect under certain circumstances, but non-bounded predications 
do not. Most, but not all, stative verbs are suffusive or non-bounded* 
Leech draws on Allen quite heavily in his analysis of tense and 
aspect in Chapter 7 of "Towards a Semantic Description of English."
He says (p.13*0-“ "Not only noun meanings but verb meanings can include 
the factor *countability.' The contrast between 'countable' and 
'mass' as applied to verbal meanings is to be identified with the 
commonly drawn distinction between "event" verbs and "state" verbs 
(or rather senses of verbs)."
It is apparent, however, that his use of the term state is 
unusual as he says on the next page that "verbs are not grammatically 
marked for uncountability as nouns are by their ability or lack of 
ability to be inflected for plural."
However, the "commonly drawn distinction between event verbs and 
state verbs" is prompted by the ability of the former and the inability 
of the latter to take progressive aspect, at least in the works of the 
authors quoted at the beginning of this chapter.
A little later,moreover,, he abandons the terms event verbs and 
state verbs in favour of "the much more valuable concept of event 
predications and state predications," and illustrates what he means by
16.
the introduction of the concept of semantic concord* He says (p*137) 
"Semantic concord is analagous to syntactic concord in that it 
consists in the distribution of matching properties amongst different 
elements of a structure."
The interpretation of the verb as countable or uncountable 
[ - Count] and plural or non-plural [£ Plur] can, for exampledepend on 
the interpretation to be placed on the object. For example, in the 
sentences :
a) Jane writes ■
11) b) Jane writes books,
c) Jane writes a book -
the lack of an object in the first sentence leads us to interpret the 
whole, predication as [- Cou] , whereas in the other two cases the fact 
that the object is in the plural and singular respectively leads to 
the interpretation that the whole predications are [+ Plur], [- Plur], 
Leech then goes on to analyse the present tense in terms of 
[4- Cou] and [-PlurJ, Corresponding to [- Cbu]we have the 
unrestrictive present state predication, which (p.138) "denotes a state 
of affairs of indefinite duration continuing through the present 
moment and is unrestrictive in the sense that no initial or terminal
point is given." Examples of [- Cou] predictions are:
12) Enough is as good as a feast.
13) Water contains hydrogen.
14) I like roses*
15) She is tall*
The other two uses of the present involve a) [+ Cou - Plur] , 
where the present tense is interpreted as referring "to an event 
psychologically perceived as taking place in its entirety at the moment
o.f speech." Examples of this the instantaneous present are;
16) He scores a goal*
17) I name this ship Victor (p. 139)*
17.
b) [+ Cou h* Plur ] "which describes a general state of affairs continuing 
through the present moment and consisting of repeated events".
Examples are;
18) He goes to bed at 10 o'clock.
19) He digs his own garden.
20) He scores plenty of goals (ip.140).
He calls this the habitual present.
Leech later discusses progressive aspect (pp.148-152) what he 
calls the ascription feature [+ Sit ]. He states that it has a
different semantic impact according to the type of predication to which
it is applied. It has the effect of psychologically "stretching the 
time span of the instantaneous present" (p.151). Compare
21) He scores a goal.
and 22) He is scoring a goal.
With regard to the habitual present he says that it has two 
possible effects either "every individual member of a set of repeated 
events is construed as having duration as in,
23) Every time I pass, he is mowing the lawn."
or "the set of events itself is construed as a state of.‘affairs
having limited duration," as in,
24) I am buying my shirts at Harrods (these days).
Of these it should be noted that, it seems to me, the latter is by far 
the most common. Indeed the other example given by Leech of the first 
type of effect, via
25)(?)On Sundays he is resting
strikes me, and others I have consulted, as simply ungrammatical*
It is,, however, with [- Cou] predications that Leech makes his 
most serious error. He says that progressive aspect has the effect of 
"psychologically shrinking the time-span of the unrestrictive present/'
i.e. state predications. This mistake seems to be due to;
18.
a) the fact that he considers 'live' to be an example 
of a state verb on p.150 where he is considering progressive aspect,
b) his seeming unawareness of the fact that linguists 
have introduced the term state stative, etc. to refer to verbs that do 
not take progressive aspect,
c) the fact that he has forgotten his list of examples 
of the unrestrictive present on page 138 (see above sentences 12)-15))*
Thus while it may be true to say that "I live in Highgate and 1 
am living in Highgate differ precisely in the suggestion that in the 
second case the residence is temporary," progressive aspect simply 
cannot be applied to the sentences that he uses as examples of the 
unrestrictive present initially. Compare sentences 12)-15) above and 
their ungrammatical counterparts:
26)* Enough is being as good as a feast,
27)* Water is containing hydrogen.
28)* I am liking roses.
29)* She is being tall.
19.
CHAPTER 3
The Copula, Copula-like Verbs, and Manner Adverbial-type
Adjectives
Despite Beech1s obvious errors in relation to [- Cou] predications, 
there is certainly some point in trying to ascribe countability to the verb 
phrase in English, while his account of the instantaneous present and the 
habitual present and the effect of progressive aspect on each seems to be 
correct in essentials.
The fact is that [» GouJ is a bad way of characterising such 
sentences as 12) - 15) in the previous chapter. One of the markers of 
countability is adverbs of frequency and they can be applied without 
grammatical unacceptability in each of the above sentences, although, of 
course, in two cases the resulting sentences are factually incorrect or 
absurd i.e: -
e.g. Water sometimes contains hydrogen.
She is usually tall.
It is probably better to revert to Leech* s initial terminology of 
event predications and state predications.
•Event* I take to be a term used to refer to what it is that is 
described when an individual is involved in describing. Allen (op cit 
PP 95 ~ 97) introduces the terms entity and event. Entity is the term he 
uses to characterise what it is that a noun refers to. He points out that 
an entity may be temporarily- oriented (e.g. a kindness), but is more 
normally spatially oriented (e.g. a cup).
1 An Event, however, involves both an Entity and a Predication, - 
* A barking dog*, for example, is an Entity not an Event: it is oriented 
only with reference to space. But when the same Entity is "placed" in 
time as in * A dog is barking* the result is the expression of an Event - 
that is an assertion.1 (pp 196-7)*
It is wrong to assume, however, that all assertions describe or 
refer to events* Put alternately, it is wrong to assume that a speaker 
can have no other aim in view when making assertions other than that of 
describing. Another common aim is classification i*e* not describing 
but relating individuals and classes to each other. Classification is 
related to time in an entirely different way from description.
Descriptions refer to events and events necessarily occur in time and have 
duration. Classification does not refer to events.
The copula is the most typical means used in English when a spealter
wishes to classify. As Lyons (1968 pp 388 - 389) points out in addition 
to the existential use of the word *16* that does not concern us here 
there are three •predicative* uses that are of importance;
'* a) the identification of one entity with another
a = b: e.g* That man is John);
b) class membership (b C e.g* John is a Catholic, 'John is a
member of the class of persons characterized as Catholic*); and
c) class inclusion (c crz D Catholics are Christians, 'The
members of the class of persons characterized as Catholic are included 
among the members of the class of persons characterized as Christians').1 
(P.389)
Moreover, following Strawson (1959) he distinguishes between 1 (i) 
sortal universals which serve to group individuals into classes - and
(ii) characterising universals which refer to qualities states actions etc. 
Typical sortal universals are the common nouns of traditional grammar; 
typical characterising universals are 'abstract* nouns verbs adjectives and 
adverbs." (op cit pp 337 “ 338)
Although it is clear that in the sentences
1) John is a Catholic
2) Catholics are Christians
an individual is being .related to a Glass and a class to a wider class
respectively, the situation is not so immediately apparent in the sentences
3) The apple is green
4) Swans ©re white
However 3) is an example of class' membership like 1) and 4) an example of 
class inclusion like 2)
In traditional terms when 'green1 is used in a sentence like 3) above, 
we are said to be ascribing a general quality to a particular object.
However, although in this particular instance there is no superordinate 
term corresponding to the class to which green belongs (as 'coloured* has 
other more specialised meanings) - nevertheless 'green* has many 
co-hyponyms (Lyons op cit pp 453 - 455) 'red* 'yellow* 'blue' etc. To say 
that the apple is green is not only to relate the word explicitly to a 
particular apple, but also implicitly to the other members of the class of 
which * green* is a member and to distinguish 'green* from these co-hyponyms. 
Strawson (1952) puts it more elegantly thus:-
"When we apply a predicate to something we implicitly exclude 
from application to that thing the predicates that lie outside the 
boundaries of the predicate we apply but in the same compatibility range"
(P.6).
In addition to the ways of classification outlined, above, Lyons also 
refers to its use in locative expressions such as ;
5) The book is on the table .
and 6) There is a book on the table -
'Be* is by no means the only verb in English that can be used for the 
purpose of classification. Many of the so-called stative verbs in English 
can be paraphrased with the verb 'be* e.g.
The tea contains sugar = There is sugar in. the tea
It doesn't matter ~ It is not import©nt
Wat or consists of hydrogen and = There is (only) hydrogen and
ojjygen oxygen in water, etc.
Some of the grammatical characteristics that distinguish the copula 
from standard verbs are the following: -
a) it can be followed by an adjective but not by an adverb,
b) it cannot be operated upon by the passive transformation.
c) apart from such instances as
He is being stupid etc. 
which we will examine below it does net take progressive aspect.
The first point to be noted is that not all verbs that have 
characteristic a) and consequently b) are copula-like. Svartvik (1966 
PP 93 ~ 94-) distinguishes between the * mutative* and ’non-nutalive* 
sub-classes of ’lexically* marked auxiliaries i.e. auxiliaries other than be. 
Examples of the mutative sub-class are: ’become* as in He is becoming lazy.
'get* as in He is getting fat,
'go* as in He is going mad.
'grow* as in He is growing old.
etc.
These are not copula-like both because they do not have characteristic
c) above and also because the idea of development of coming to be rather 
than being is present#
Non-mutative verbs* on the other hand are much more resistant to 
progressive aspect. Among them the following classes can be distinguished,
A) Copula-like verbs of sensation 
Palmer (1965 P.96) has pointed out that verbs of sensation can be 
divided into three cle.sses.
(i) verbs which have the general class meaning "having the 
sensation**1 as in:
7 a) I (can) see my brother,
b) I (can) hear the music.
23.
(ii) verbs which have the class meaning "having the 
quality to produce the sensation*" as in;
8) a) Ivy 'brother looks ill.
b) The music sounds lovely.
(iii) verbs with the class meaning "to act to achieve the 
sensation*" as ins
9) a) He is looking at ny brother.
b) He is listening to the music.
He says that the situation is obscured, because with regard to the 
three other verbs of sensation i.e. 1 smell’* ’taste* end ’feel' the same 
lexical item is used in each sense. Thus corresx^ onding to 7) we have:-*
10) a) I (can) smell the fish.
b) I (can) taste the fish.
c) I (can) feel the key*;
and corresponding to 8) we have:
11) a) The fish smells nice,
b) The fish tastes nice.
c) The key feels hard.;
and corresponding to 9)
12) a) I am smelling the fish.
b) I am tasting the fiph.
c) I am feeling the key.
Although the ’verbs’ in both (i) and (ii) classes are stative it is 
only the verbs in class (ii) that are cox>ula-like.
However* although they are copula-like ’sound’ ’look’ etc. are not 
copula-equivalent* The difference of meaning between them and the copula 
comes out most clearly in value judgements*. Compare:
13) a) The apples look good.
b) The engine sounds O.K.'
2 4*
which are much more guarded statements than:
34) a) The apples are good,
b) The engine is O.K.
13 a) can be expressed in terms of 34 a) as roughly
The apples are good, as far as the sense of sight is concerned only.
While 31i- b) would be more appropriate coming from a garage mechanic 
after an investigation of the engine and 34 a) from the average car owner 
after listening to it,
B) The verbs 1 seem* and 'appear1
These are also copula-like verbs in so far as they too share the 
characteristics of the copula listed above. They have a semantic role 
somewhat similar to the verbs of sensation as compared to the copula..
Compare
15) He seems/appears intelligent (to me) and
16) He is intelligent
In 15) the speaker would be qualifying his judgement, hedging his bets, in a 
way that he would not be doing in 16)
G) Middle verbs
This is a term introduced by Lees (i960 P..8) and further utilised by 
Chomsky (1965 pp 103 - 104). Lees includes under this heading ‘have* 'cost* 
’weigh.* ’resemble1 ’mean*. Chomsky adds ’fit* and ’marry,’ These verbs are 
supposedly distinguished from all others in that they do not take manner 
adverbials freely and do not take the passive transformation. Chomsky 
relates these two syntactic characteristics in a rule whereby (roughly) the 
passive transformation is one of the realisations of the manner adverbial 
component.
These are two of the characteristics that we have seen distinguish 
the copula and copula-like verbs from others. Moreover, it is noticeable 
that middle verbs are also reluctant to take progressive aspect. They
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differ from the verbs we have so far considered as being copula-like, in 
that they are followed by nouns rather than adjectives.
It is extremely doubtful whether ‘marry* should be included among middle 
verbs, as it is a verb that takes manner adverbials freely and can also take 
progressive aspect. However verbs such as ’cost 'weigh* ’fit* and others 
such as ’measure* * match* >’ equal* etc are stative and copula-like.
Compare the sentences;
17) a) The book costs £1
b) The book weighs 6 pounds
c) The pitch measures 100 yards.
The above sentences can be paraphrased with the copula thus;
18) a) The book is £1. (in price)
b) The book is 6 pounds, (in weight)
a) The pitch is 100 yards, (in length)
In sentences like 17) find 18) we are relating individual things to 
systems of money, value, weight, measurement etc that are operative in 
society and, furthermore, relating an individual thing to a numerical value 
on. that SGale i.e. classifying, not describing, the book and the pitch.
A similar type of classification is at work in the following 
sentences
19) a) The shirt matches your tie
b) The shirt fits you
c) The shirt suits you
These are, in fact, value judgements, relating the shirt to a tie or person 
in terms of a scale of aesthetic values more specifically concerning colour 
in the first instance, relative siae and shape in the second instance and 
more generally in the third instance.
Verbs in groups A) - C) can then be seen to be essentially copula­
like not only in their syntactic characteristics as outlined above, (p. 22 
but also semantically in so far as their primary purpose is to classify i.e.
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to relate an individual to a class or a class to a wider class. In the case 
of groups A) and B) their function is to modify the commitment of the 
speaker to the judgement in some way, in the case of group C) the class in 
terms of which the •complement1 noun is related to the subject noun is so 
to speak anticipated by the use of the copula-like verb or, to speak more 
figuratively, the copula is-clothed and thereby disguised by this class*
Wy suggestion is, therefore, that certain verbs be given a dictionary 
entry of copula-like to reflect the above mentioned syntactic and semantic 
characteristics that these ve bs have in common. This means, of course, 
that such verbs as weigh cost measure etc would have two lexical entries to 
account for such sentences as
a) weighing
20 b) They are costing the wood
c) measuring
Another verb included among the middle verbs by Chomsky and Lees is 
the verb ’have,1 in the sense of possession. Lyons (1968 pp 391 - 395) 
suggests that
21) John has a book 
may be derived from an underlying
22)* A book is John* s 
by a compulsory transformation.
He also points out parallels between locative and possessive 
constructions in English which suggest that John in the above sentence may 
be regarded as a sort of human locative; vis:-
23)H A book is at/near/with John
The manner in which the idea of possession is expressed in other 
languages is as Lyons points out valuable corroborating evidence. Russian, 
early Latin and Welsh, for example, all eatpress possession in a way similar 
to 23) above.
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2Zf) Russian IT menja fcniga (near)
25) Latin est mihi liber (to or at)
26) Welsh X mae gennyf llyfyr (with, in the comitative
sense of that preposition)
There is also the verb ’belong1 in English Which when the subject 
is definite could be considered a substitute for the copula,
’Have* is like the copula and the copula type verbs in that it, too,
is not used to describe an event but to relate a thing and a person.
However, we shall have more to say about ’have’ and have-type verbs below*
Non-stative adjectives
We have seen that classification like description is countable but
c
that the addition of adverbs of frequency is factually odd under certain 
circumstances, e.g. in sentences such ass-
27 A)m John is often tall*
B) John is occasionally dark.
However, let us now compare the following pairs of sentences;
28) A) It is often wet in England.
B) The tide is often high at this point.
29) A) John is ofben stupid.
B) John is sometimes clever.
30) A) John is tall*
B) John is dark.
The classes to which John is related in 30) above,i.e* those of
relative height and complexion are not changeable like the height of the 
tide, the state of the weather or John’s behaviour. This appears to be the 
reason why adverbs of frequency cannot be applied and why consequently 27) 
are unacceptable.
However, although 28) and 29) Gan take adverbs of frequency, only 
29) can tales progressive aspect, i.e. 31) are ungrammatical.
31) A)* It is being wet in England today*
B)k The tide is being high at this point now.
Changeability and the consequent possibility of an iterative interpretation 
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an adjective to be 
classified as non-stative.
The further condition is that these adjectives should be the 
adjectival forms of adverbs of manner answering the implied question 
"How does X behave?"
There is a paraphrase relationship, at least, between such sentences
as: -
32 A) John is behaving stupidly
and B) John is being stupid.
33 A) John is behaving cleverly
and B) John is being clever.
34 A) John is behaving reasonably
and B) John is being reasonable.
This relationship can be checked by reference to Lakoff1 s list of 
non-stative adjectives given at the end of this chapter*
There appears to be a case here of what we might call 'category 
shifting',, i.e. what in Jespersen* s terminology is a category of the third 
degree (see Lyons 1968 pp 327 - 329) appearing with the surface structure 
characteristics of a category of the second degree. In view of this 'shift' 
the verb 'be' now loses its characteristics as a classificatoiy device and 
takes on some of the characteristics of a verb like 'behave* i.e. volition is 
ascribed to the subject. This comes out clearly, for example, in sentences 
like,
The weather is being aggravating again today.
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where the construct ion attributes volition to something that is not 
normally thought of as having volition*
How the above should be formally incorporated into a grammatical 
framework is by no means clear; although some use might be made of the 
suggestion, for example, that there is a transformational relationship 
between A) and B) in 32) - 34) above.
However, there is no doubt that interpreting non-stative adjectives 
as in some sense “ultimately" mannex* adverbials enables us to understand 
how they can be used freely with progressive aspect. Although various 
authors have noted that adverbials do not colligate freely with stative 
verbs, (of Lakoff op cit footnote p. 1 - 10 and Chomsky and Lees above 
p. 2%), there has to my knowledge been no evidence noted of any restriction 
holding between manner adverbials and non-stative verbs. It is to be 
expected, therefore that non-stative adjectives, "categoxy shifted adjectival 
adverbials" will also appear quite freely with progressive aspect.
Lakoff1 s list of non-stative adjectives
careful
cautious
noisy
useful
fair
unfair
asinine
foolish
polite
impolite
obnoxious
reasonable
rough
silly
tactful
pleasant
unpleasant
nasty
offensive
rude
insistent
frank
discreet
reckless
persistent
officious
realistic
troublesome
These can be added to by 'despondent1 and 'intelligent* which he 
appears to have wrongly included under the heading of 1 stative adjectives'
32.
PART 2
STATIVE VERBS AM) LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER If
The Treatment of Stativity in Books 
Teaching English as a Foreign Language.
Of the writers listed in the Bibliography Joos comes closest to 
regarding stative verbs as copula like or classificatory, i.e. as 
indicating a relationship between an individual and a class, or a class
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and a wider class.
He initially divides stative verbs (he calls them status verbs)
Into
"two main groups l) psychic state including the specific 
perceptions (SEE, HEAR, etc.) and the intellectual and emotional attitudes 
(BELIEVE, UNDERSTAND, HATE, LUCE, REGARD, etc.) 2) relation, such as the 
relations of representing depending excluding and so on" (op cit p.118).
He concludes, however, "that the sorting-out of status verbs 
into relation verbs and psychic state verbs is perhaps an expository 
convenience but not a logical necessity," (p.119) and that both can be 
subsumed under the general heading of relational.
His account, however, is unfortunately somewhat cryptic and not 
argued out in any detail.
Joos* s treatment of status verbs includes a lengthy quotation 
from W. Stannard Allen's "Living English Structure", an account which 
is fairly typical of the way in which stative verbs have been treated 
by many of those who have tried to explain their reluctance to take 
progressive aspect to foreign learners of English.
To Allen stative verbs are "mainly verbs of condition or behaviour 
not strictly under human control, consequently they go on whether we 
like it or not." (p«78). He then goes on to examine the difference 
between the verbs in the sentences 
I see a man.
He is looking at me*
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in these terms.
Pit Corder (i960) gives a similar explanation viz;- "the actions 
they describe cannot be stopped or started at will" (p.76),
Hornby (1953) puts it slightly differently;- "These verbs denote 
various mental perceptions states of mind or feelings. —  They denote 
a state or feeling that is assumed to have no end" (p'.ll6).
Pour presuppositions seem to underly one orrall of these 
explanations;-
1) that progressive aspect is not used when an "action" is 
not under control or
2) when an action is "assumed to have no end,"
3) that verbs describe actions,
4) that verbs denote,
I shall argue that all four presuppositions are wrong.
With reference to l) it is clear that in some cases we can and
in other cases we must use progressive aspect to refer to what is not 
under our control as for example in the sentences
I* m feeling sick 
which is quite as grammatical as
I feel sick
or in cases such as
I am crying 
where progressive aspect Is obligatory
He 2) an action which is assumed to have no end is character­
istically expressed in English by a construction with progressive aspect. 
Leech points this out (op cit p.251) "the continuous is characteristically 
found with verbs denoting some kind of inexorable process." In 
addition to the examples quoted by him we could also cite such 
examples as:
Pollution is becoming more and more of a problem for mankind.
The rat population is growing bigger every day.
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Re 3) we have already seen that a characteristic feattire of 
stative verbs is that they cannot occur in association with the pro-verb 
'do1 and cannot be said to describe actions.
Finally, and most importantly, there is the presupposition 
explicit in the case of Hornby above but implicit in many other writers 
that all verbs 'denote' something. The word 'denote* is not always 
used. Oita, for example, talks of verbs "indicating perception or 
mental and psychological state" (op cit p. *851 ) and Palmer of private 
verbs.that refer to mental activities or refer to sensations (op cit p.95) 
and verbs of state that "refer not to an activity but to a state or 
condition" (p.97)♦
Underlying all these remarks are assumptions about how words 
mean, and even when writers, unlike Pit Corder, realise that stative 
verbs do not describe activities, there is still the assumption that it 
is the job of all verbs to 'describe', 'indicate*, 'denote* or 'refer to* 
something, if not to activities then to * states', ' mental perceptions*, 
'feelings' etc*
However, it should not necessarily be assumed that a word 
necessarily 'refers* to anything at all. To make this clear was one 
of the great contributions of Wittgenstein and his followers to thinking 
about language, and in the next section reference will be made to some 
writers in this tradition, who are of importance to our general theme.
CHAPTER 5 
Linguistic Philosophy
As Quinton says in "Contemporary British Philosophy" (reprinted 
in Wittgenstein edited by George Pitcher p.ll).
"The fundamental point of Wittgenstein’s new theory of meaning 
[ i.e.]Philosophical Investigations 1953 is that the meaning of a word 
is not any sort of object for which the word stands." The unconscious 
assumption is often made when attempting to analyse meaning that all attempts 
at analysis should be ultimately reducible to the name-thing model.
This indeed was the position taken by the early Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) where elementary propositions 
envisaged as an arrangement of names picture the state of affairs, i.e. 
the real world as an arrangement of objects. "Sentences that do not 
express elementary pictorial assertions are either collections, overt 
or concealed, of elementary propositions, or they express'no propositions 
at all and are devoid of meaning." (op cit p.5)*
However, as Howe11-Smith (195k) points out, in the spirit of 
new Wittgenstein, names in fact do not mean at all (p.65)* A foreigner 
confronted with a text on the British Constitution would be told if he 
asked jrhe meaning of "Churchill" that actually Churchill "doesn’t 
exactly mean anything; it is a man’s name — . The word has a linguistic
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job to i.o but its job is one ofjmeaning" (p.67)«
Nor is it true to say that because the function of many words is 
to refer to people, things, actions, properties, etc* that this is the 
function of all words. Referring is only one of the many uses to 
which words or phrases or sentences may be put.
Implicit or explicit in the work of these philosophers is the 
fact that they believe a lot of confusion has been caused by philosophers
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having a naive approach to the relationship between grammatical classes, 
such as noun, verb, adjective, etc.. on the one hand, and such semantic 
concept as substance, activity and property on the other. As Flew 
comments (l956/pp*5“6, see also footnote k page 6)•
"The Greek way of forming abstract noun substitutes from the 
neuter of the indefinite article and the adjective does something, 
though not of course very much, to explain the attraction for Plato of 
the Theory of forms."
Nowell-Smith also argues that the doctrine that all adjectives 
stand for properties is responsible for Moore's conclusion that the v/ord 
good is similar to yellow in standing for something simple and indefinable, 
though different from yellow in that while yellow is a natural property 
good is a non-natural property. It is only when we free ourselves from 
the name-thing model and ask what the words good and yellow are used 
to do that it becomes evident that while the latter is used to refer, the 
former is used for a variety of loosely resembling purposes such as the 
commendation of a course of action the giving of advice etc., etc.
(op cit pp*6k-65).
The relationship between syntactic classes and their meanings 
will be discussed later. However, having roughly established the 
general framework in which these philosophers operate, it is constructive 
to consider how two of them approach the fact that is central to this 
paper, namely that certain verbs in certain contexts do not normally 
take progressive aspect.
CHAPTER 6
Urmson and Parenthetical Verbs
Urmson (1956) writes on so-called parenthetical verbs. He 
does not assume that these verbs describe or refer to activities,, but 
nor also does he assume that these verbs denote or refer to states* 
Indeed, his approach is that in their primary use they do not refer to 
anything at all. Their function is quite different: it is "to prime
the hearer to see the emotional significance, the logical relevance, 
and the reliability of our statements." (p.197)*
The class is Initially delimited on a linguistic rather than a
conceptual basis* Parenthetical verbs can be inserted at the
beginning of a sentence (with or without a following that) its middle
or its end as in the following:-
1) I' know (that) your son is a liar.
2) Your son is, I know, a liar.
3) Your son is a liar, I know.
When used parenthetically none of these v erbs can be used with
progressive aspect. This distinguishes the 'think1 of
k) I am thinking about your son 
from the 'think1 of
5) I think that your son is a liar.
As the above quotation suggests Urmson wishes to divide the 
parentheticals into three groups.
A) firstly, there are verbs that give emotional orientation to 
the statement with which they are associated, the only two he mentions 
are 'regret' and 'rejoice* as in
6) I regret that your son is dead .
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7) I rejoice that your son is at home again.
I shall callthese emotional parentheticals.
B) The second group of verbs is used to signal "how the 
statement is to be taken as fitting logically into the discussion."
(p.198). These verbs include 'admit1, 'presume', 'presuppose',
'confess', etc*
$) The third group to which he devotes most attention is "used 
to indicate the evidential situation in which the statement is made 
(though not to describe that situation) and hence to signal what degree 
of reliability is claimed for and should be accorded to the statement 
to which they are conjoined." (p*199). The verbs mentioned in the 
class include 'know*, 'believe* and 'suspect*, but presumably 'hear*, 
'understand', 'think', 'imagine* and many more could be included. I 
shall call these intellectual parentheticals*
Urmson maintains that in standard circumstances the making of 
a statement presupposes that it is both true and reasonable, indedfi the 
possibility of lying depends on this presupposition.
When parenthetical verbs are associated with statements the 
hearer is helped to understand to what extent the presupposed truth 
and reasonableness is affirmed or modified by the speaker, i.e. to 
what extent the statement is backed up by evidence.
Compare the sentences:
8) I know )
9) I think j that your son is a liar
10) I hear ]
The evidence implied by the use of 'know' is (or should be, if 
one is not oneself a liar or deliberately misleading) overwhelming*
The use of 'think' does not imply such overwhelming evidence, though 
the evidence should be good, while 'hear' signals the fact that somebody 
has told us and that is all the evidence there is.
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Urmson compares parenthetical verbs with sentence adverbs on 
syntactic grounds, i.e. their parenthetical nature. Sentence adverbs 
are distinct from ordinary adverbs in that the latter are not moveable 
within the sentence while the former are.
Compare
Your son plays football, unfortunately and its 
alternative versions:
Your son, unfortunately, plays football 
Unfortunately, your son plays football 
with, for example
Your son plays football intelligently.
Urmson says further that "provided it is not construed as a 
list of synonyms we can couple these adverbs with parenthetical verbs 
as follows; happily - I rejoice; unfortunately“I regret; consequently 
I infer (deduce); presumably-I presume; admittedly - I admit; 
certainly « I know. It is not possible to say that every adverb has 
a verb corresponding to it which has more or less the same import or 
vice-versa. But it does seem that these adverbs play much the same 
role." (op cit pp.200-201).
It is interesting to note in this connection that Greenbaum 
(1969) in his study of English adverbial usage delimits a class of 
"attitudinal disjunct®" on formal grounds which correspond, quite 
closely, to Urmson1s semantic groupings of the parenthetical verbs.
As G-reenbaum puts it ;
"Semantically attitudinal disjuncts can be assigned to two 
major groupings
[ij those that convey an attitude towards the truth- 
value of what is being said, e.g. clearly, certainly outwardly*
[ 2_j those that convey any other attitudes towards what 
is being said.
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Urmson's group B) above to which such verbs as ’admit1, ’infer1, 
’deduce’, etc.. belong to Greenbaum* s first grouping, (sqe p.203). We 
will, put forward arguments later, however, suggesting that this group 
although certainly parenthetical in Urmson*s sense, should not be 
considered as belonging to the same general class of verbs as groups A) 
and C).
Parenthetical verbs are used not only to "prime the hearer" they 
can be used with other persons and in other tenses as well. Urmson 
considers the verb ’believe* in this connection (pp.202-203)•
The sentence ' Jones believes that the trains are working’ can 
mean at least two things
a) It can be a case of reported speech equivalent to Jones
says that he believes that the trains are working.
b) It can also be a prediction on the basis of his behavious,
e.g. rushing for the train that he would say, "I believe that the
trains are running," if the situation arose.
In these:: circumstances it could be argued that the verb is being 
used dispositionally. Urmson, however, denies the analysis evident 
in Ryle (1949 pp.43 ff) that because verbs such as; 'believe* do not 
describe an occurrence, they must describe a tendency to occurrences.
In a) and b) above "he believes" is reducible to someone saying 
"I believe" andihe argument that the first person present tense use 
is in some sense primary is given statistical backing by the Yrork of 
A'kira Ota. (op cit).. Working'from a considerable amount of material 
both written and spoken, he has worked out the percentage use of 
progressive aspect with a large number of verbs. As a result of his
analysis verbs are divided into ranks from 1-5* Rank 1 verbs are
those where the percentage use of progressive aspect with verbs is 
between 0 and 5. Rank 2 verbs are those where the percentage is 
between 5-10 etc*
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Rank 1 verbs are then divided into
a) "verbs indicating a mental or psj^ chological state" ...... they are
called I verbs. (p>. <4. )
b) verbs indicating relationship.
It is clear that in his analysis of the class meaning of I verbs, 
Ofca is using the name-thing or reference model rather than the use 
model of Urmson# However, he states that he calls group a) I verbs 
because they occur much more frequently with i/we as subject both in 
statement and question and you as subject (in question), than with you 
as subject (in statement) or a thiifd person subject (both in statement 
and question." (pf>. 3,-3) • He gives statistical evidence to back up 
this assertion*
Finally, three points about the relationship between sentence 
and verbs and parentheticals.
Firstly, there seem to be many more sentence adverbials than 
parenthetical verbs to express attitudes of any kind, and this is 
especially true of what we wish to convey emotionally*
Secondly, it is noticeable and significant that G-reenbaum is 
not tempted to say that attitudinal disjuncts name denote or refer to 
anything but that they "convey" something.
Thirdly, some sentence .adverbs and intellectual parentheticals 
can also be roughly related to modal verbs. Compare the following 
sentences.
I know your son is in London.
Your son is, certainly, in London.
Your son must be in London.
I expect your son is in London.
Your son is, probably, in London.
Your son should be in London.
( think )
( )
I  ^ believe; j Tour son
( suppose )
Tour son is ( perhaps ) 
possibly)f
( may T
Tour son ( might ) be ii
can
could
is in London*,
in London,
London,
Ii2 \..
CHAPTER 7 
Austin and Performative Verbs
We will return to Urmson's views later in this paper. However,
"Parenthetical Verbs" is an article that has not received a great deal of
attention from linguists. In contrast, J. L, Austin's book "How to do Things 
with Words," which is the subject of the present chapter has recently been 
discussed by linguists such as Macaulay (1968), Boyd and Thorne (1969),
Seuren (1969) and Boss (1970).
Austin begins the work by delimiting a class of performatory 
utterances. These utterances are characterised by the presence of a verb in 
the present tense, non-continuous, non-habitual 'aspect', together with the 
first person singular personal pronoun - I.
Examples are such sentences as:
1) I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.
2) I bet you sixpence that it will rain tomorrow.
3) I promise you that I will arrive on time.
As Austin point out (P.6)
"In these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in 
of course the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what 
I should be said in so uttering to be doing, or to state that I am doing it: 
it is to do it."
The naking of a performative utterance, or (to put it alternately) the 
use of a verb in a performative sense is "far from being usually, even if it 
is ever' the sole thing necessary if the act is to be deemed to have been 
performed." (P*8) . Indeed, "the action may be performed in ways other than 
by a performative utterance." (P.9) • For example, we may bet by going to a 
betting shop filling in a slip and handing it over to the bookmaker without 
saying a word.
Performatives are not true or false like statements, what Austin calls 
oonstatives. However, they may be used inappropriately or insincerely
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(See particularly Lecture 2 pp 12 - 2/+). It would be inappropriate for 
the milkman to say "I pronounce you man and. wife" of* for a priest to say 
it in the presence of two cars. It would be insincere for me to say "I 
congratulate you on your appointment when I am not pleased or "I advise you 
to go" when I do not believe that course of action expedient for the person 
I am talking to.
Performative utterances in Austin's terms may be happy or unhappy as 
compared to constatives which may be true or false.
Later in the book Austin argues that the performative/constative 
distinction is a less useful distinction than that between illocutionary/ 
locutionary aspects of the speech act, together with a further aspect the 
perlocutionary.
What Austin naans by these distinctions can be exhibited by the 
consideration of a sentence such as:
4) There is a bull over there.
In certain circumstances this seemingly constative sentence can be 
uttered as a warning, and it is this aspect of the utterance that is 
abstracted and referred to as the "illocutionary force." In other words,
4) can be equivalent in meaning to
5) 1 hereby warn you that there is a bull over there.
Another aspect of the utterance that can be abstracted is the
locutionary, that is open to verification in terms of "an oversimplified 
notion of correspondence with the facts," (P,145)«-
The perlocutionary aspect of the utterance is the effect brought 
about as a result of the utterance, e.g. that people do not go near the bull
or close the gate as a result of the warning.
He gives examples of verbs which embody as far as possible "pure" 
locutions, illocutions and perlocutions on pp 101 — 102.
6) a) "Locution. He said to me, 'Shoot her!’
b) Illocution* He urged (or advised, ordered, etc.) me to
shoot her.
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6) c) Perlocution. He persuaded me to shoot her.
He got me to (or made me) shoot her. 
Amongst other examples cited of ’'pure" illocutionary and perlocutionary 
verbs are 'argue' and 'convince' as in, for example,
7) a) Illocution. He argued that the world was round,
b) Perlocution. He convinced me that the world was round* 
Austin, who is mainly interested in illocutionary force continues by 
arguing that saying and stating etc "seem to meet all the criteria we had 
for distinguishing the illocutionary act," ('P.133)* These criteria include 
the fact that the following sentence is unexceptional.
8) "In saying that it was raining I was not betting or arguing 
or warnings I was simply stating a fact." (P.133) •
Also what appear to be constatives i.e. "pure" statements can be judged on 
the happiness/unhappiness dimension as well as the truth/falsity dimension.
Statements may be inappropriate or insincere. Somebody who says that 
the present King of Prance is bald is not saying something that is true or 
false but rather something inappropriate, of, the priest "marrying" two cars 
above. Similarly, somebody who says there are 30 people in the next room, 
when he has absolutely no grounds for saying so, has (like the milkman 
performing the wedding ceremony) no right to say so. Insincerities also 
apply to statements i.e. the cat is on the mat "implies" that I believe that 
the cat is there, in a parallel way to which, I promise that I will be there 
"implies" that I intend to be there.
Just as statements may be inappropriate or sincere so do performatives
have a truth/falsity dimension: an estimate of a number or the judgement
that a man is guilty may be true or false, etc.
Austin, therefore, concludes that "in general and for all utterances 
that we have considered (except, perhaps foi’ swearing) we have found
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(1) Happiness/unhappiness dimension
(la) An illocutionary force
(2) Truty/f alsehood dimension
(2a) A locutionary meaning (sense and reference)".
(P*146)•
Austin and linguistic theory
The broad distinction between the illocutionary and locutionary is 
reflected in the works of many modern linguists. Coup are Fillmore (3.968) 
and his division of sentences into Modality and Proposition: Seuren (.1969)
and his division into Operators and Nucleus and Halliday*s (1970) distinction 
between an interpersonal and ideational function. In the case of Seuren some 
reference is made to Austin's theory (see P.139). In each case, however, the 
conclusion appears to have been arrived at independently.
In many places Austin seems close to formulating a distinction between 
deep and surface structure. For example on page $2 he draws a distinction 
between explicit and implicit performatives,
"It is of course both obvious and important that we can on occasion 
use the utterance 'go* to achieve practically the same as we achieve by the 
utterance 11 order you to go*:"
Again (P.69) he says that the explicit performative utterance 'I promise 
that I shall be there* could take the form *1 shall be there.1 Similarly 
(pp 61 — 62) he argues that a possible way of defining a performative 
utterance is saying that "any utterance which is in fact a performative 
should be reducible or1 expandable or analysable into a form with a verb in 
the first person singular present indicative active," For example, 'you are 
hereby warned* can be changed to * I hereby warn you.1
Such remarks can easily be expressed in terms of a transformational 
generative grammar i.e. it can be argued that a performative element underlies 
all the sentences of a language and that a sentence such as:
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I (hereby) order you to go. 
may be reduced to 
Go!
by an optional deletion transformation, or changed to 
You are (hereby) ordered to go. 
by the operation of the passive transformation. In both cases the 
transformations are meaning-preserving.
Such an approach has been made by Macaulay (1968) and Ross (1970) and 
reference will be made to their theories later together with an attempt to 
incorporate the ideas of Austin and Urmson into a general linguistic theory. 
We will, in so doing, try to relate performative verbs and the idea of 
"perlocution" to the concept of causation which is also of importance in 
current linguistic research. However, before examining causation in grammar, 
transitivity to which it is related must be examined.
PART 3
TRANSITIVITY AND CAUSATION
CHAPTER 8
Transitivity
We have already seen that the traditional definition of a verb 
as a doing word is implicit in the works of Lakoff,- Seuren, etc*
(cf also Halliday (1970) p*153)> in the sense that typioal verbs can 
answer implicit or explicit questions with the pro-verb 'do'* We 
have, however, also seen that some verbs are not similarly associated 
with ’do* although, formally, they must still be considered as belonging 
to the class of verb. This can be alternatively expressed as follows 
not all verbs are doing words but all doing words are verbs*
Lyons has treated the traditional definition of substantive as 
the name of a person or thing in a similar way in recent works 
(1966 and 1968). His argument is briefly the following. The criteria 
for membership of the grammatical class 'noun1 are formal. Prom this 
standpoint 'boy*, 'ear1, 1 John*, ’beauty1, 'truth*, 'electricity' all 
belong to the class. Of these some ('boy* for example) refer to
people or things while others ('truth* for example) do not, so that
it is obviously wrong to define a noun as the name of, or (in terms 
of linguistic philosophy) a word typically used to refer to, a person 
or thing*
However, as Lyons points out,there are two- distinct questions 
to be answered here:
a) Do all nouns denote or refer to people or things ?
b) Do all the words that denote or refer to people or things
belong to the class of nouns ?
While the answer to a) is no,the answer to b) is almost
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definitely yes: or as Lyons puts it (1966 p.21A),
"We will not expect to find that all members of the class X name 
things [are used to refer to or name things J , but we may expect to find 
that all lexical items that do denote things (that are used to name or 
refer to thingsj fall within a syntactic class- X*" The alternative 
version in square brackets is mine to square Lyons1 account with the 
conclusions of Ch*5 above*
Xt would indeed be surprising if there were absolutely no trutlj 
in traditional grammatical explanations and definitions, and I believe 
that arguments analagous to the above can be used to save the 
traditional definition of transitivity. The term transitivity derives, 
according to Robins from the Greek grammarian Apollonius who defines 
"the active verb as a word that designates an action 1 passing over to 
something or someone else*." (Robins (1967) p*37)* It is of course 
easy to ridicule the traditional definition as e.g. Robins (196A) does 
when with reference to the sentence ’John loves Mary' he asks, "who 
does what to whom ?" However, in an analagous way to the above we can 
restate the traditional definition of transitivity in the following 
way i.e. not that all verbs that are grammatically transitive refer to 
the passing over of an action from subject to object, but that all 
actions of this type are referred to by means of a transitive construction*
Lyons (1968) distinguishes many types of verbs, which would all 
presumably have the dictionary entry - verb (transitive or intransitive).
For example, a verb may appear intransitive formally as well as 
transitive because of object-deletion, as in:
1) a) John reads books, 
or b) John reads.
Other verbs are implicitly reflexive e.g.
2) John never washes (himself) before lunch:
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while the sentence,
3) John never shaves before lunch 
is ambiguous because John may or may not be a barber in that sentence, 
(see Lyons op. cit. pp.360-363).
Lyons also notes the relation between causation and transitivity 
i.e. that 1 some transitives are derivable from the one-place intransitive 
construction by means of a causative operation which has the effect 
of introducing an agentive subject" (op. cit p.359). The verbs in
question include 'move', ’open1, Change1, ’stop’, etc. and can be 
illustrated in the sentences,
if) a) The stone moved,
b) The door opened,
and their causative counterparts,
5) a) John moved the stone, 
b) John opened the door.
However, as Lyons goes on to point out, not all "transitive verbs 
lend themselves very happily to analysis as realisations of verb + caus. 
They may be called basically transitive verbs" (p*38if). Examples 
would be such verbs as 'hit1, 'look at', 'read', 'study1, etc., 
i.e. there are no constructions
6) a)* the table hit,^
b)* the picture looked at*
related to
7) a-) John hit the table.
b) John looked at the picture, 
as sentences like if) are related to sentences like 5) •
Y/e will now analyse the notion of causation and transitivity 
in relation to the theories of Eillmore*
CHAPTER 9
Fillmore and Case Grammar
Fillmore (1968) does not seem to distinguish between Lyons' 
class of basically transitive verbs and causatives. In his theory 
transitive and intransitive constructions and the interpretation of 
certain nouns as subjects and other nouns as objects in transitive 
constructions, are the result of the operation of deep structive cases. 
Cases are semantic and syntactic primitives which specify the relation­
ship of the verb to the nouns with which it is associated in a given 
construction. These relationships are tenseless. and belong together 
with the verb and the noun or nouns with which it is related to the 
propositional constituent. The other constituent 'modality' covers 
"such modalities on the sentence as a whole as negation, tense, mood 
and aspect." (p.23). He does not, however, discuss this constituent
further *.
The first rule of his grammar is therefore
Sentence --- $ Modality + Proposition, a rule which
he assumes to be universal.
The expansion of the proposition takes the form oof "a verb 
and one or more case-categories," which will later be given "the 
categorial realisation as N.P (except for one which may be an 
embedded S)." Certain cases will, moreover, have certain prepositions 
characteristically associated with them* (p*32).
As I intend to comment on them in some detail, I will now quote 
in full Fillmore's definitions of five of the cases, omitting the 
locative .
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"The case notions comprise a set of universal presumably innate 
concepts"# They include:
Agentive (A), the case of the typically animate perceived 
instigator of the action identified by the verb.
Instrumental (l), the case of the inanimate force or object 
causally involved in the action or state identified by the verb.
Dative (D), the case of the animate being affected by the state 
or action identified by the verb*
Factitive (F), the case of the object or being resulting from 
the action or state identified by the verb or understood as part of 
the meaning of the verb.
Objective (0), the semantically most neutral case, the case of 
anything representable by a noun whose role in the action or state 
identified by the verb is identified by the semantic interpretation of 
the verb itself: conceivably the concept should be limited to things
which are affected by the & H N H I  action or state identified by the 
verb . (pp.24-25).
While in English, cases are most typically manifested in surface 
structure by prepositions and word order, other languages ’inflect' 
the noun. However, none of these surface structure phenomena are to 
be taken as more than a guide to deep structure case*
The propositional constituent is expandable in the following
manner:
Proposition ---  ^V + <BJt + — — ------- © , where it is
understood that C, Cn etc, are cases typically manifested in English 
by the characteristic preposition associated with a given case - K - 
and an N.F*
To conclude this highly abbreviated account of Fillmore's 
theory. Verbs can be inserted into a sentence if the "frame features"
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which are associated with a particular verb in the lexis and 
"which indicate the set of case frames into which a given verb 
may be inserted,H are consistent with "the particular array of cases, 
the * case-frame1 provided by the sentence*" (p.27).
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CHAPTER: 10 
Analysis of Fillmore*s Cases
In Fillmore*s system, nouns in the agentive and dative cases 
are compulsorily animate, (p.26 though see footnote 31 page 2k), the 
difference being that while agentives are instigatory, datives are 
affected. Fillmore (p.3l) equates the verbs that.1take* datives 
rather than agentives with Lakoff*s class of stative verbs, so that 
the transformation that introduces progressive aspect, true imperatives, 
etc. cannot apply if the ,case-frame contains a D and no A. Halliday 
(1970) p.153 makes essentially the same point in his discussion of 
what he calls mental process clauses, where we cannot really talk of 
an actor or a goal, but where the "inherent roles are those of a human 
or at any rate animate being whose consciousness is impinged upon, 
and some phenomenon which impinges upon it."
The agentive differs from the instrumental in that the latter 
is necessarily inanimate while as we have seen the former is animate. 
They share, however, the characteristic that in Fillmore*s system 
they are the cases that are in some sense "responsible" for the 
occurrence of the action identified by the verb. The agentive is 
said to be the case of the "instigator" of the action and the 
instrumental the case of the noun "causally involved." The agentive 
is the preferred or unmarked subject. In Fillmore’s words:
"In general the unmarked subject choice seems to follow the 
following rule:
If there is an A, it becomes the subject; otherwise if there 
is an I, it becomes the subject; otherwise the subject is the 0."
(p.33).
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Although Fillmore does not express himself in this way the 
preferred object choice would seem to be factitive or objective, 
depending on the nature of the verb, Fillmore says that the factitive 
can be the case of an object or being, though it is difficult to think 
of many instances where a being is the result of an action identified 
by the verb. He is presumably thinking of such sentences as:
1) He breeds horses,
2) God created man,
3) They produced a child.
The objective, should ,!conceivably, be limited to affected 
objects according to Fillmore and if this conceivable definition is 
accepted then the objective differs from the dative only in terms of 
animateness, and differs from the factitive in terms of the distinction 
mentioned earlier in his paper (p.4) between effected and affected 
objects, Fillmore amusingly illustrates this distinction with 
reference to such sentences as,
4) John paints nudes
which he points out is ambiguous, though it can be disambiguated 
because "the effected object does not permit interrogation of the 
verb with do to," (p.4). Thus
"What John does to nudes is paint them" is only capable of 
being interpreted with nudes as an affected object.
Accepting the "conceivable" definition of the objective case 
and ignoring such sentences as l) - 3) above, i,e, restricting 
factitiyes to inanimate objects, we can achieve an idealised and, 
doubtless somewhat distorted, componential analysis of Fillmore1s 
cases as: follows:-
58*
Agentive
Dative
+ Ahimate 4- instigatory
+ Animate 4- affected
factitive - Animate 4- effected
Objective - Animate 4- affected
Instrumental - Animate 4- causative
The question now arises as to what Fillmore means by the terms 
1 agentive * and1instigate *
Linguists seem undecided as to how the term ' agentive1 should 
be used* Leech (op. cit.) relates agency to causation* He says:
"Agency I take to be a particular instance of the broad concept of 
causation: it is namely a limitation of that notion to human causes*"
Fillmore is careful, however, not to mention causation with 
reference to the term agentive. However, in the idealised componential 
analysis above both effected and affeoted objects are the result of 
the activity identified by the verb, i.e. no matter which interpretation 
we give to 'nudes’ in A) above a state of affairs is in some way 
changed as a result of the activity of painting, and results have 
causes*
To make the situation clearer let us consider the following 
sentences from a notional point of view:
In notional terms the action of studying can hardly be said to 
effect or affect literature, in the way cakes are effected by the 
action of making, or stones affected by the action of moving*
(p.205).
5) John studies literature*
6) Peter makes cakes*
7) Charles moves stones*
What is common to 6) and 7)> however, is the fact that some 
change is brought about as a result of the action referred to by the
verb. The existence of the calces and the movement of the stones are
the result of the causal activity of Peter and Charles respectively.
Verbs like ’make1 and 'move* should be distinguished from verbs
like 1 study1 in that the former take agents in Leech1s sense as subjects 
while the latter do not. John cannot be called agent in 5) above, 
and we will use the term 'actor' to characterise the subject of such 
verbs.
Thus, in a manner akin to Anderson (1970), I suggest a distinction 
between two-term causative verbs that 'take' an agent in subject 
position and two-term non-causative verbs that 'take1 an actor in 
subject position* The causative verbs will then be subdivided into 
those that take an effected and those that take an affected object*
Two-term non-causative verbs share most of the syntactic 
characteristics of two-term causative verbs.
In some respects they have syntactic characteristics similar 
to causative verbs that take effected objects, e.g, while the following 
are all acceptable sentences.
8) What he does is a) study literature
b) make cakes
c) move stones, 
note the unacceptability of 9) a) &n& h).
9) a)* What he does to literature is study it.
b)i;‘ What he does to calces is make them
and the acceptability of c).
c) What he does to stones is move them.
In general, however, the most important syntactic differences
between the classes are between causatives and non-causatives.
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It is strange that Fillmore, himself, in a later work, draws 
attention to some of these differences, though not relating them to 
the same conceptual framework as the above.
Fillmore (1970) studies in detail the grammar of hitting and 
breaking. He notes that while there are what appear to be three 
"verbs" of breaking as in the sentences:
a) John broke the stock with a rock.
10) b) A rock broke the stick •
c) The stick broke,
there appear to be only two "verbs" of hitting:
11) a) John hit the stick with a rock,
b) A'rock hit the stick*
That is, there is no construction with ‘hit1 comparable to 10) c) 
above, and
c)* The stick hit
1
is an unacceptable sentence. In Lyons1 terminology 'hit* is a 
basically transitive verb (see above p. 52 ).
He then points out that there are many verbs that behave 
syntactically like break, such as 'bend1, 'fold', 'shatter' and 
'crack', and many that behave syntactically like 'hit' such as 'slap', 
'strike', 'bump' and 'stroke*. Since 'hit* and 'break' are members 
of classes of verbs, the question arises as to which "properties are 
associated in general with the verb classes to which they belong" and 
which are "more uniquely associated with the two words as individual 
lexical items," (1970 p.125).
He calls the verbs of the class to which 'break1 belongs 
"change of state" verbs because in each case the verb asserts "of an 
object a change in time from one 'state' to another," while verbs of 
the class to which 'hit' belongs are called surface-contact verbs 
because, while theyassert the occurrence of some physical contact
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between two objects, they do not ninfer that the objects have 
undergone any essential change”* (p.125). Fillmore compares the
two sentences:
I hit the window with a hammeri it didn't faze the window but 
the hammer shattered.
*1 broke the window with a hammer: it didn't faze the window but
the hammer shattered.
"Faze”, I am informed (by a reliable native informant) can be 
translated as affect, suggesting that change of state verbs and verbs 
that take "affected” objects should be identified, i.e. 'break' belongs 
to the same class as 'move', as, indeed, Fillmore indicates (p.130)* 
'Hit' on the other hand, has the same syntactic characteristics as 
' study' ,
* Literature studies 
is unacceptable, and the same semantic characteristics in so far as 
no change of state is asserted of the object.
A further important difference between what we may now call 
'causative* and basically transitive verbs concerns the passive 
transformation and is brought out by Fillmore in the same article. 
Though Fillmore is only concerned with change of state verbs, i.e. 
verbs that take 'affected' objects, the same argument also holds for
verbs that take factitive objects.
Sentences that appear to contain causative verbs in the passive
are ambiguous. Consider Fillmore1s examples:
(broken )
( )
The table was (bent
shattered.
These sentences are ambiguous because they may be interpreted as
passive transforms of active sentences, i.e.
("broke )
Somebody [bent ] the table.
(
(shattered )
or as sentences that contain *stative' adjectives, i.e. adjectives 
that refer to a state that was in existence as a result of activity 
at a previous time.
Sentences containing basically transitive verbs are not 
similarly ambiguous, while the above argument to the effect that this 
syntactic fact held for all causatives can be seen from the analagous 
ambiguity of the following sentences:
The cake was made*
The bridge was built.
The letter was written*
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Basically transitive Change of state Verbs that take
verbs verbs, i.e. verbs that Effected Objects#
take Jcffected objects:
study break make
read open build
look at move write
hit shut create
stroke stop produce
slap annoy cxjok
meet smash draw
criticise alter paint
shoot change bake
call convince fashion
fight persuade
sit on shorten
stand on frighten
etc. etc.
6if#
CHAPTER 11 
Digression on the perfect in English
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The above drawn distinction between causative verbs and basically 
transitive verbs also enables us to relate and find room for the varying 
interpretations given to the meaning of the perfective aspect in English,
Nowadays, the most favoured interpretation is probably that given 
by Twadell (i960), namely, the perfect is used in situations where an 
action that occurred in the past is in some way relevant to the current 
speech situation. Palmer (1965) explains the meaning of the perfect in a 
similar way. By comparing the perfect with the past in sentences such as:
l) a) I have seen/saw John this morning,
b) I have mended/mended it today,
c) He has written/wrote the letter today,
he notes that “the periods of time indicated by the present perfect and the 
past overlap,1 Why then do we use one form rather than the other? He 
states that the perfect always indicates a period of time that includes the 
present and that in cases like the above when the perfect is used - 
“a period of time that includes the present is chosen precisely because 
there are features of the present that directly link it to past activity,"
(p.74).
However, other analysts have given different interpretations.
Common among text-books of English as a foreign language is the so-called 
perfect of result. To Pit Corder the perfect is used “for action which 
took place in the past, the results of which we can feel or observe in 
the present.“ (op cit P.81), Hornby also talks of the perfect being 
“used to refer to the present result of an activity or experience in the 
past," (op cit P.95)*
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This interpretation has been criticised (wrongly in my view - see 
below) by Palmer (op cit P.75) as "misleading unless we interpret results 
to include 'nil' results as is shown by:
2) I've hit it twice, but it's still standing up.
3) I've written, but they haven't replied.
A third interpretation of the perfect is discussed in the work of 
Robert Allen (l?66). He argues that "the opposition between past-verb 
forms and the so-called pee sent perfect verb forms is primarily one of 
identified time/non-identified time." (P.157) He maintains, indeed, 
that a profitable comparison can be drawn, between the use of the indefinite 
article and the perfect, and the definite article and the past (pp I52-I58). 
For exanple the use of the past tense of the verb in
4) I saw him
implies either that the time or location is included in the context of 
situation or that the sentence is incomplete and should be expanded to
5) a) I saw him last week,
b) I saw him in Greece.
On the other hand,
6) I have seen him
not only does not imply that the time is definite it positively implies 
that the time is indefinite as can be judged from the unacceptability of
7) KI have seen him at 2.30.
A distinction between causative verbs and all others, including 
basically transitive verbs enables us to find room for these varying 
interpretations. We can interpret the perfect as always contributing the 
meaning of current relevance, that it is used when we wish to relate an 
event that happened at. some time in the past to the current speech 
situation. When a causative verb is used in the perfect, it is the result 
of that causal process that will be currently relevant.
Notice in this connection the transformational relationship noted 
by Lyons (1968 P*3%) between
7} a) John has built the house.
and both
b) The house has been built,
and c) The house is built.
What Lyons did not point out was the fact that this relationship is one 
that holds for causative verbs only whether they take affected or effected 
objects, (cf the list of causative verbs given above for confirmation 
of this fact.) Indeed to say this, is only to reiterate, in terms of the 
present, the ambiguity, pointed out by Fillmore (1970), shorn by causative 
verbs in passive constructions in the past; i.e. 7) c) above is also 
related to
7) d) Somebody builds the house (e.g. every year) which is a 
factually unlikely, but a grammatically possible and meaningful sentence.
Non-causative verbs do not have this option. For exanple take the 
1 stative* verb 'see' in the sentence
8) a) Mary is seen by John.
This sentence can only be considered as a transform of
8) b) John sees Mary (e.g. regularly)
and not of
8) c) John has seen Mary.
Similarly take the basically transitive verb 1 study* in the sentence
9) a) Literature is studied by John.
While this sentence is transformationally related to
9) b) John studies literature,
it is not similarly related to
9) c) John has studied literature.
Thus to refer to the critism of the result interpretation made by- 
palmer and exemplified in sentences 2) and 3) above: in 3) write is a.
verb that takes an effected object and is, therefore, a causative. The
result of the action of writing is the letter and not a reply to it. In 2)
'hit* is not a causative, but what Fillmore called a surface contact verb, 
the class of which we have considered as forming a subset of the class of 
basically transitive verbs. Had the verb * break' been used instead of 'hit' 
in a sentence like 2) e.g.
10) I have broken it, but it's- still standing up. 
some other result i.e. the fact that it is broken would have been evident, 
despite the fact that it is still standing up.
It is equally noticeable that when non-causative verbs are used in 
the perfect as 8) c) or 9) c) above, although the current relevance 
interpretation is still present, there is also the strong suggestion that 
the event took place in the indefinite as opposed to the definite past, an
interpretation which is strong because of the absence of any causal
'overtones.'
Finally, it should be noted that cause and result exist in language 
independently of causative verbs, and that a sentence which contains a 
non-causative verb may take on a causative interpretation because of what - 
may be termed the facts of the situation. This is often expressed 
linguistically by use of what Leech calls 'the causative conjunction 
because* (op cit P.208), and can be illustrated by the following question 
and answer sequences:
A. Why is she crying?
B. Because she has fallen down.
A, Why is he so well read?
B. Because he has studied literature.
A, Why are you so sure?
B. Because I have seen the film.
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However, in those instances it is the sentences in which the verb 
appears that are causative, and not the non-causative verb. Thus, the 
sentence can be embedded before the causative verb ’make* in each instances 
It* s having fallen down that is making her cry.
It’s having studied literature that makes her so well read.
It’s having seen the film that makes me so sure.
Thus, while a non-causative verb in the perfect can take on a 
resultative interpretation as part of a causative sentence, a causative verb 
must have this interpretation, in the perfect, even if some further result 
which was intended was not achieved as in 3) above.
CHAPTER 12
More on Cases
I propose now an amendment of the 1 idealised* componential analysis 
of Fillmore’s cases (above P. 58) in the following terms:
Active (Act) * Actor - Causative
Causative (c) * Actor * Causative
Dative (d) + Affected + Animate
Factitive (F) * Effected - Animate
Affective (Af) + Affected - Animate
Objective (0) - Actor - Resultative 
Various points need to be made about this revised conponential 
analysis.
Firstly, Fillmore's agentive case has been divided into two cases 
one causative and the other not, and neither is specified for animacy; the 
reason for which will become clear presently.
Secondly, of the four other cases three are related to causation in 
some way. The semantic specifications Affected and Effected are of course 
types of results of previous causal activity. The other case ’objective' 
is minimally specified and has no relation to causation but is related to the 
Active case. The above, of course, illustrates what Fillmore calls 
"dependancy relations - among cases (see Fillmore (1968) P.87)*
Thirdly, if we could be sure that there were only two types of result 
there would be no need for both terms affected and effected, 
i.e. *t* affected would imply - effected or vice-versa. However, not only 
would such an approach be unnecessarily dogmatic in a rather obscure field, 
it would also complicate the exposition.
Fourthly, and most importantly, we have omitted the Instrumental case 
from the above conponential analysis. This is because the situation is 
not as clear as Fillmore suggests.
With a verb such as ’open* it is clear that in the sentences 
l) John opened the door with a key. 
or 2) The key opened the door,
'the key* is an instrument in both cases, used by a human agent. The
situation differs, however, in that while the agent is mentioned in l) it
is only 'understood* in 2), assuming that 2) does not occur in a fairy story.
In Halliday* s terms (1970 pp 150 - 1^ 2), the verb 'open* is always 
associated with three 'inherent roles' as is the verb 'pelt', that he 
considers in this connection,- in such sentences as
3) "Roderick pelted the crocodile with stones."
4) "The crocodile got pelted."
As Halliday points out: "The verb pelt — is always associated with three
participant roles: a pelter, a pelted and something to pelt with" (P.I50).
"So
5) Roderick pelted the crocodile
is (inherently) instrumental, and although no instrument is mentioned the 
receiver interprets the message as having an instrumental role associated 
v/ith it." (pp 150 - 151)
Similarly,
6) Stones pelted the crocodile.
or 2) above are inherently agentive, i.e. the receiver will interpret the 
process as having an agentive role associated.
However, not all non-agentive instrumentals can be regarded as, 
what. we may term, "upgraded instrumentals." Earlier in the same article 
(P.14B)s Halliday considers the sentence
7) It was singed by the fire.
saying that some might consider (and Fillmore is mentioned explicitly)
"by the fire" instrument, rather than actor, onf the grounds that fire is 
inanimate.
Fillmore (1968 P.32) postulates that the "rules for English 
prepositions may look something like this: the A preposition is 'by*; the
I preposition is ,by* if there is no A, otherwise it is 1 with*;"
However, the I preposition may be 1 with'even when there is no A, i.e.
8). The door was opened by the key*
or 9) The door was opened with the key.
are both possible.
The point is, as Halliday points out (op cit P. 148) that "with is 
not normally used where the action is unintentional," so that
10)81 It was singed with the fire is unacceptable.
Halliday suggests that "we need here a further distinction between 
instrument and natural force," and there seems to be two possible ways of 
changing Fillmore* s theory to conform to this proposal. We could produce 
a new case or embody the suggestion implied in the componential analysis, 
abandoning the rule that all causative subjects are either animate 
agentives or inamirnate instrumentals and subcategorise the causative verbs 
in the lexis as taking animate subjects, inanimate subjects, or both by 
contexb-fe&ture rules in a manner similar to Chomsky (1965) • Fillmore has, 
it seems, made the mistake of elevating the typical instance, the 
statistical probability, into a grammatical rule, i.e. because most verbs 
take animate subjects he says (with reservations) that all must. However, 
once the distinction between basic transitive verbs end causative verbs has 
been made, it becomes clear that as far as causative verbs are concerned, 
animate agents, inanimate forces and '‘upgraded instrumentals," are not the 
only possible subjects.
Cases and Embedding
Leech in his discussion of causation has this to say: (op cit P.208) j
"The element preceding ^ CAU is completely unspecified: it may
be a cluster specifying a human agency, or a non-human even inanimate 
cause. It is also possible for the preceding element as well as the 
following to be a rank-shifted predication in which case —  ^ CAU is 
generally expressed by because or some other causative conjunction." In 
Leech1s theory rank shifted predication is "limited to the case of a 
predication which is a constituent of another predication," (P.26) and 
"may be likened to the embedding principle of the phrase structure 
component of a transformational granmar." (pp 25 - 26).
Sentence embedding is accounted for in Fillmore (l%8) by the 
proposal that S is always embedded under the 0 case, so that, for example, 
before the subject copying transformation, the underlying representation 
for, "It is true that John likes Mary," is (l%8 P.41)*
S
CO
t k a i:  Jokn. CLkIS Mcc^'
However, Leech* s proposal to the effect that embedding can occur on 
either side of the causative verb is not considered by Fillmore, but it 
seems to explain satisfactorily, the following sentences l) - 3) below,
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containing the verb ‘make1.
l) John made a cake 
will have the following underlying representation in our amended version of 
Fillmore1 s case system and with the K nodes omitted.
A.) g
|V|ocl
C CL I
However, as Lyons points out (1968 P.439) ’make' is not only the 
minimally specified ‘existential causative* taking an object of result,
(the factitive case in the above representation), but also a causative
auxiliary as in the following sentence
2) John made Mary eat a cake
The most natural underlying representation for 2} would appear to be;
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B.)
M  c
v'
Pro p
This analysis is supported by Anderson (1970) who also treats * make* 
"as an effective sub-type of Causative'." He points out that "such a 
treatment would explain why it is that ‘make* occurs as one of the 
minimally specified causative verbs that take a sentential objective — as 
in *1 made John leave.’ Otherwise it is difficult to show a systematic 
relationship between the occurrence of ’make* with an object of result and 
its appearance as a superordinate causative." (op cit P. 102).
It should be noted, however that make does not take a "sentential 
objective," but rather a "propositional objective." The sentential element 
is devoid of tense aspect and modality as can be seen e.g. from the 
unacceptability of the following sentences
is eating a cake.
As Leech’s proposal implies, sentence, or propositional embedding 
can also take place under the causative node. Thus
can eat a cake
“John made Mary ate a cake
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3) The singing of the choir made the audience happy, 
can be given the following representation:
0 .)
M o d
1'1-UL o_t_ J; Q-^ol lu^ppy
Such an approach obviously changes Fillmore * s case system fairly 
radically, however, and poses the question as to whether the term fcase* 
should still be used. Case as a grammatical category has traditionally 
been associated v/ith the noun and its inflectional possibilities. 
Derivations such as B.) and C.) above can probably be best expressed by 
regarding such 1 semantic primitives1 as cause and factitive, as semantic 
slots capable of talcing at least two types of syntactic filler, i.e. a 
N.'P. and a proposition — a type of semantic/syntactic tagmeme.
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CHAPTER IE .
Cause, Change and Result
In this chapter, where the analysis owes a great deal to Lyons (1968
especially pp.397 399) > the concept of change and its relation to
grammatical theory will be examined more closely, This concept has already 
been utilised in the description of two classes of verbs, namely the class 
that Svartvilc calls 'mutative verbs’ (see above p.11) and the class that 
Fillmore calls ’change of state verbs.’
The two classes of verbs appear to be related in the following 
manner. In sentences where mutative verbs are used, e.g.
1 a) John is becoming upset.
b) The chair is getting broken.
c) The goose is getting fat.
change (in progress in the above examples) is indicated, but the cause of 
the change is unspecified; while in sentences where their causative change 
of state equivalents are used namely;
2 a) Charles is upsetting John.
b) Charles is breaking the chair.
c) Charles is fattening the goose.
the cause of the change is specified in addition to the change itself.
Change of state verbs, therefore, i.e. verbs, that in our grammatical 
framework, can be inserted into the C — — Af frame, are also imitative verbs, 
differing from them only in that they can take causes as subjects.
Thus, change or mutation can be considered as the class meaning of
large numbers of verbs, though again it is evident that the basic 
transitives that are inserted into the A ■—— 0 frame do not share this 
meaning, i.e. there is no change in progress indicated in the following 
sentences, though there is activity in progress:
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3) a) He is hitting the ball.
b) He is studying literature*
c) He is reading a book, etc.
The class meaning of the verbs that can be inserted into the 
0 —  F frame is intuitively clear, and may be stressed as production or 
creation: though, whether this can be related to the concept of change,
and if so, in what sense, is problematical. For the purposes of this 
study, we will assume that the class meaning of these two types of verbs 
cannot be so related.
When the process of change is at an end, and a result thereby 
attained, this may be expressed in many ways. Firstly, the cause of the 
re suit may be specifically mentioned, and the resultative interpretation,
attaching to all causative verbs when used in the perfect, relied upon to
ensure that we are referring to a state that is in existence at the 
present, e.g.
4) a) Charles has upset John.
b) Charles has broken the chair.
c) Charles has fattened the goose.
Secondly, it may be particularly indicated that the process of change 
is at an end, by the use of the perfect with a mutative verb as in:
3) a) John has become upset.
b) The chair has got broken,
c) The goose has got fat.
Thirdly, the resultative state may be stressed by the use of a 
stative adjective in association with the copula. In this instance the 
causative agency responsible for the resultative state will be more or less 
implied according to context, e.g.
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6) a) John is upset.
b) The chair is broken.
c) The goose is fat.
Before continuing, there are two points to be made with reference to 
the above:
A) it can now be seen that it is the ’change' meaning, 
that is contained in causative verbs, that is responsible for the 
resultative interpretation they get when used in the perfect, i.e. 5) 
implies 6) as much as 4) implies 6). !
B) there are, of course, other possibilities for expressing 
the idea of result, some of which have been already mentioned, e.g.
The goose is/has been fattened.
The chair has been broken.
Consideration of such sentences would, however, complicate the issue, and
4) - 6) will suffice for our present purposes*
Mutative verbs and change of state verbs refer to what might be 
called changes of quality or condition. Change may be of a different 
nature, however; there is also change of location expressed by the verbs of 
motion, for example.
Corresponding to sentences like 1) above, there are sentences like
7) below, which signify that change is in progress, but where the cause of
the change is unspecified*
7) a) John is going to Ulster.
b) Mary is coming to London,
Then corresponding to 2) above, there are sentences like 8) which
not only signify that change is in progress, but also specify the cause of
the change.
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8) a) Charles is talcing John to Ulster.
b) The regiment is sending John to Ulster.
c) Charles is bringing Mary to London.
Like 4) we have examples like 9) below, where perfective aspeot in 
combination with a causative verb implies a resultative interpretation.
Perfective aspect with verbs signifying change of location, 
illustrated in 10) below, are similar to the mutative verbs with perfective 
aspect as in 5) where again a resultative interpretation is implied.
The result implied by 9) and 10) is like 6) above expressed by the 
present tense of the copula, though in this case a locative expression,
rather than a stative adjective, is used as in,
11) a) John is in Ulster,
b) Mary is in London.
A further type of change is change of possession. Like Bierwisch
jv
(1970 p. 176) we would asseKt that 12) below (like 7) and 1)) embodies the 
semantic concept of change.
12) John is getting some books.
We would supplement his analysis of sentences such as 13) below, however,
in claiming that they embody not only the concept of cause but, more 
accurately, like 2) and 8), that they embody the concepts of both cause and 
change (in progress):
9) a) Charles has taken John to Ulster.
b) The regiment has sent John to Ulster,
c) Charles has brought Mazy to London.
10) a) John has gone to Ulster,
b) Mary has come to London.
13) a) Charles is giving some books to John.
b)
c)
selling
lending
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Sentences like 14) and 15) below, are analagous to 4) and 9) , and
5) and K)) , respectivelys
14) a) Charles has
b)
c)
given
sold
lent
some books to John.
15) John has got some books 
and both imply the resultative sentence
16) John has some books.
where the verb 'have* like the verb fbe* in 6) and 11) is in the present 
tense•
Because of the notional and syntactic similarity between all the 
verbs embodying the concept of change, I now suggest a rule, similar to those 
in the previous chapter, where C and 3? were regarded as semantic slots rather 
than cases. Just as C and P could be billed1 by N.P. or Prop, so Af can 
be regarded as a semantic slot capable of being filled by N.P, N.P + J&oc, 
or N.P. * datives so that underlying sentences such as 4) b), 9) b) and
14) a), for example, will.be the following derivations;
r-0
N.P
84.
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In the above sentences it was noted that while a sentence may embody
the concept of change with no specified cause, sentences may also occur 
where a resultative state is referred to and the preceding cause and change 
more or less implied according to context. This means in terms of our 
grammatical framework that iii’ can he chosen independently of cause and a 
change verb, and that underlying e.g. 16} above is a derivation of the 
following type
Obviously, however, ’to John some books' is not identical with 16), 
nor is 'John to Ulster' equivalent to 11) a), nor especially is 'the chair1 
equivalent to 6)b) etc.
Wkht is needed, therefore, is a rule indicating that when AD1 is 
chosen, independently of cause and a change verb the following 
representation will replace the above, underlying 16).
a.) S
H#)
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Similar modifications mil have to be made when the locative is 
chosen i.e. the motional preposition 'to* will be replaced by one of a set 
of 1 stative* prepositions, e.g. 1 in', 1 on*, 1 at! etc. and the verb ''be* 
inserted. Similarly, when there is no change of state verb or mutative 
the verb *be* together with a stative adjective may be added to an N.P 
under the domination of Af.
There are many attractive features of the above analysis. Among 
them are the followings
i
a) it provides a formal basis for the intuition that 'have* and 
*be are closely related.
b) it relates the locative and dative cases in the way Lyons 
suggests (see above P.26 }
c) it relates the motional prepositions Ho* with the stative 
prepositions, and to the Ho* associated with the dative or indirect object*
Finally, it is of Interest to note how each of the types of 
resultative stative can be related to questions with the verb *got* though 
not with the verb * become.* Note the parallelism of the question forms 
that ere related to the following statements:
John has some books. How did he get them?
The chair is broken, Ilow did it get like that?
Before continuing I will try to express the above observations by 
drawing up a set of grammatical rules, developing a fragment of the 
propositional component*
John is in London How did he get there?
Rule 1 A •]• action vb + 0
C -i- produce vb -4- F / 
G -!* change vb Af \
(change vb) Af. j
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The above rule formulates the distinction between basic transitive 
verbs and causativess between causatives that are related to Factitive 
semantic slots and those related to Affective semantic slots; between 
change verbs that take causative semantic slots and those that do not; and 
between verbs that can appear under the Affective node i.e. 'have1 and 'be*' 
and. all others.
Rule 2.
Af N.P
Stat ado
Rule 3. D have * D
Log IWWI be -e* Loc
Stat adj be -t- St at adj
no cause 
change vb
These two rules attempt to make formed the considerations of the 
present chapter.
The lexical entry for verbs will indicate what type of verb it is.
If it is an action verb, there will, of course, be no need to specify the 
ca.se, environment in which it occurs. Similarly, if it is a 'produce verb' 
it will be redundant to specify its case environment. However, if like 
'make' it can take propositions as effected objects, this must be indicated, 
as must the fact that it can take a proposition as its subject. A change 
verb will have a much more exact specification i.e. whether it takes a C 
as subject or not and which of the various developments of the Af node it 
takes as 'object'; or, of course, 'subject* if it is a change verb that 
does not take aC as its 'subject' such as 'go', 'become', 'get' etc.
Rule 3 could also be developed so that copula-like verbs such as ' seem’ 
'appeal’* 'look* etc. could be insei’ted as well as the copula.
Finally it is., of course, important that the lexical entry for 
verbs should also include details of the syntactic or semantic features of
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the nouns with which the verb is associated. We have rejected the notion 
that there should be an agentive case that is necessarily animate, (though 
not, it should be noted a dative case that is necessarily animate), and thus, 
the information as to whether a particular verb can take an animate subject 
or not must be provided by the lexis. Our lexical entries for verbs, 
therefore will look like those of Fillmore (1968) in so far as each verb 
will be specfied for a case (or, more exactly, in some instances, a semantic 
slot) environment. In most other respects, however, they will, as far as I 
can see, look like those of Chomsky (1965)*
Finally, it will of course be necessary to develop the semantic slots 
C and F, in something like the following manner
We have given C the further development S, because of -the fact that 
sentences rather than propositions appear to fill the causative slot with 
verbs such as sadden and gladden which we consider above (P. lit ) in 
relation to the emotional parentheticals.
0 -— » < Prop >
Rule 5
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PARENTHETICALS AND PERFORMATIVES
CHAPTER 15
Parentheticals
We have already referred to the class of verbs that Austin 
calls perlocutionary. Austin defines the perlocutionary act as 
•’the achieving of certain effects by saying something,1 (op* cit.p.120) 
so that notionally causation seems to be involved. Among the verbs 
that are most purely* of this type, Austin mentions persuade1 and 
'convince1, let us, however, in addition, consider ’tell* and 'inform'.
The class meaning of these four verbs appears to be to (try to) 
achieve an intellectual result on somebody by the use of language.
We will call them intellectual perlocutionaries.
I want to suggest that this sub-class of Austin's class of 
perlocutionaries is related to Urmson's class of intellectual 
parentheticals in a similar fashion to which 'give' is related to 'have'.
The first general point that bears out this approach is the 
obvious one that convince, persuade, etc. are three-term verbs, while 
the intellectual parentheticals, e.g. know, think, believe, understand, 
are two-term, e.g.
l) a) I convinced him of something,
b) I know something.
Let us now compare 'have' and the intellectual parentheticals*
The first obvious point to note is that 'have' and the 
intellectual parentheticals are stative in Lakoff's sense.
Secondly, when these and the other intellectual parentheticals 
can be nominalised it is 'have', acting as a 'dummy verb' that is 
inserted to link the subject to the nominalised verb. Thus related to:
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a) ( know )
2) b) X ( think j that Sidney is a professor
c) ( believe )
d) [ understand )
we have the somewhat stilted, but possible alternatives:
a) ( the knowledge )
(
3) b) I have ( the thought ) that Sidney is a professor
o) ( the belief
d) ( the understanding
This is, of course, not the only dummy verb that can be inserted 
before a nominalised verb. As we shall see later, performatives are 
more typically nominalised with the Mummy verbs' 'make* or 'give*, e.g.
4) a) I give you an order to go.
b) I make a prediction that it will rain.
Let us now consider the similarities between the intellectual
perlocutionaries and 'give*.
In the first place they are notionally causatives, as v*e have
already seen, and further evidence of their causative character will
be given presently.
The second point of similarity depends on the introduction of 
yet another instance of embedding in our grammar, this time of a 
sentence, not a proposition under the N.P. node. Fillmore would give 
the following derivation of the sentence.
We persuaded John that he could win (omitting the K nodes).
The example is taken from Robinson (1970 p.62).
92
I)
fO
This analysis seems correct ana is easily expressible in terms of our 
grammatical framework, i#e* by the addition of the AF node dominating D 
and 0 (or rather N.P.)#
What is noticeable about such a derivation, however, would be 
that it would be identical to F) above where a sentence with the verb 
’ give* is analysed apart from the fact that a sentence is embedded#
This supports the view that ’persuade1, like the other intellectual 
perlocutionaries, is a causative that takes a dative and a sentential 
component and is similar to give in that this sen'WHItential component 
changes possession# Notionally what it amounts to is that sentences 
or rather ideas may be passed from one person to another, i.e. there 
may be an interchange of ideas between people#
The next point concerns aspect. We have frequently noted that 
a causative verb or a verb that incorporates the notion of change, when 
used in1, the perfect, implies a resultative state that may be referred
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to "by the present as well as the perfect.
5) a) John has broken the stick
implies both the following:
b) The stick (is ) broken,
c) ( has been )
while
6) a) John has given the book to Mary
implies both the following:
b) Mary ( has ) the book$ }o) ( has been given ;
The same holds for the intellectual perlocutionaries.
a)  ^convinced )
7) b) He has j persuaded ) me that Sidney is a professor
c) f informed j
d) ( told )
implies both;
a) ( convinced )
8) b) I am \ persuaded ] that Sidney is a professor
c) ( informed
d) ( told
and:
a) ( convinced )
( )
9) b) I have been ( persuaded ) that Sidney is a professor
c) | informed
d) ( told
On the basis of the above it could therefore be argued that if
I am convinced -=£=■ I know, then convince cause to know.
Parallel arguments could lead to the setting up of other approximate 
equivalences, e.g.
Persuade =£= cause to believe or think, 
tell cause to hear or understand.
9^*
It should he stressed that it is not essential to our argument 
that the above should be more than rough equivalences* They are, 
indeed, certainly no more than that. Moreover, there are intellectual 
perlocutionaries such as 'warn* or ’advise1 that have no rough 
intellectual parenthetical counterparts, and conversely many intellectual 
parentheticals such as 'imagined, ’suppose*, ’assume1, etc* that have 
no rough counterparts among the class of intellectual perlocutionaries*
It should be noted, however, that the relationship between having and 
giving is not so straightforward as has sometimes been assumed, i.e. 
having may be the result of not only giving, but also selling, 
lending, etc*
What we are trying to show is that there is a sub-class of 
causative verbs, i.e. the class of intellectual perlocutionaries that 
are related to a class of. resultative stative \erbs - the intellectual 
parentheticals, that the intellectual perlocutionaries have the class 
meaning ’cause a change to an intellectual result',.and the intellectual 
parentheticals are used in circumstances where that result is assumed 
to have been attained, i.e. that in terms of our grammatical framework 
parentheticals should like ’have' and ’be* Somehow be introduced 
under the domination of the Af node.
Not only, then, have we found room for the non-syntatically 
motivated insights of two philosophers in our grammatical system, we 
can now also see why intellectual parentheticals and, presumably, other 
stative verbs like them, cannot take progressive aspect.
We say that 'we are convinced' or that we know; we are told or 
that we hear; only after a causative process has been successfully 
concluded. Progressive aspect can be applied to 'be convinced1, i.e. 
it is possible to say
10) a) I am being convinced that S.
This is, of course, related to, e.g.
10) b) John is convincing me that S.
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Such sentence a; signify that a causative process is in progress, 
and that a result is in view but that that result has not yet been 
attained. It is only when perfective aspect has replaced the progressive 
in 10) a) and 10) b) and the resultative interpretation of that aspect 
on causative verbs is in operation, as in:
11) a) John has convinced me that S,
b) I have been convinced that S*
c) I am convinced that S,
that *know* is roughly equivalent to 'be convinced'• Expressed
alternately, we can say.that progressive aspect cannot be used with
'know' because the function of the word is to signify that a result 
has been reached and to inrply though not, of course, to state the nature 
of the cause of that result.
This is of course very close to what Urmson says. Let us 
quote again his definition of intellectual parentheticals. He says 
that they are used "to indicate the evidential situation in which the 
statement is made (though not to describe that situation), and hence to 
signal what degree of reliability is to be accorded to the statement to 
which they are conjoined." (op. cit*. p.199)* This can be related to
our analysis in so far as 'the evidence' can appear in subject position, 
i.e. as the filler of the causative semantic slot before such words as 
'convince* and 'persuade*, i.e.:
The evidence'has convinced/persuaded me that Sidney is a 
professor.
Sentential or rather propositional elements may, of course, be chosen 
instead as a filler of the causative semantic slot - the term 1 the 
evidence1 is, of course, a short hand reference for such elements, e.g.
Seeing Sidney walk out of the office with that happy smile has 
convinced/persuaded me that Sidney is a professor.
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Thus, when use is made of one of the intellectual parentheticals 
such as *1 know1 or *1 believe', a choice appears to be made between
them on the basis of the type of 'affect' that the evidence had upon
me at some time in the past and still has upon me.
The reliability of the 'affect* that the evidence had may be 
signalled as being as great or small as that of a third person who has 
told me, or informed me, as when we say
I hear/understand that Sidney is a professor.
In other instances the speaker is prepared to take more responsibility 
for the quality of the evidence that justifies the truth and reasonableness 
of the associated statement, as when we say:
I know that Sidney is a professor*
In this instance we have accepted the evidence as overwhelming, -
convincing, in fact - and consequently the statement as certain.
In the case of:
I believe )
)
I think ) that Sidney is a professor.
I expect ]
the evidence, while persuasive, is not overwhelming 
while in cases such as:
I suppose )
I imagine j that Sidney is a professor.
I suspect )
there is even less overwhelming evidence; what is expressed are 
varying degrees of the possibility of the truth and reasonableness of 
the associated statement.
That the evidence is seen}±n some way, as being in a causative 
relationship with sentences involving parenthetical verbs, is apparent 
from the fact that the term 'because* (which we have already referred 
to as a * causative conjunction') is used. When such verbs as 'know*,
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'think1, 'believe', etc. are questioned, e.g.
How do you know
Why do you think that Sidney is a professor ?
Why do you believe 
the evidence is directly referred to as the cause of the statement when 
the answer is given:
Because I saw him coming out of the office with a happy smile on 
his face, etc.
Urmson*s claim that all statements in standard circumstances are 
interpreted as being true and reasonable is evident from the fact that 
the same questions can be asked of a sentence that is not qualified by 
an intellectual parenthetical, e.g.
A'. Sidney is a liar
B. How do you know that ?
Why do you think that ?
The use of such parentheticals would, therefore, appear to be 
governed by a particular desire by the speaker to "prime the hearer" 
to the 'evidential situation in which the statement is made’. This 
is done by choosing a verb which because of its resultative character 
links the statement indirectly to the evidence which is its cause.
A final point in this connection is that the grammatical 
framework which has been set up to account for intellectual perlocutionaries 
and intellectual parentheticals enables us to interpret quite naturally 
expressions such as the following:
I have an ides that S.
What has given you that idea ?
I have been forced to the conclusion that S.
That has certainly made me think that S.
etc., etc.
CHAPTER 16
Performatives Imperative Sentences and Modality
Turning from parentheticals to performatives what is immediately 
striking is the difference in the dummy verb which these verbs take 
when they are nominalised* As we have already noted, parenthetical 
verbs take 'have', performatives, however, generally take 1 make1 or 
* give1,
Prom this standpoint verbs generally considered performatives 
fall into three groups:
A) Those that take 'make1, e.g, promise, suggest, state, 
affirm, propose, predict, assume, judge, vow, deduce, etc. as in:
(promise )
|suggestion 
(statement 
|affirmation 
(proposal 
I make the (prediction* ) that S. 
assumption 
judgment 
vow 
(deduction
etc.
B) Those that take ’give' e.g. order, command, permit, 
advise, instruct, name, as in:
( an order )
( a command )
( )
I give you ( permission
( the advice
r the instruction }•etc.
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take
C) Those that can/both 'male©1 and 'give' , There seem to 
be o n ly  two verbs of this type, viz promise and suggest.
1 make a promise that S*
I give you my word that S1 
I make the suggestion that S'
I give you a suggestion that Sf
It should be noted that, with the exception of 'name', all the 
verbs in the above list that are nominalised with 1 give*, have three 
'roles1 associated with them, i.e. like give they are three-term verbs, 
but that like the intellectual perlocutionaries one of the roles is 
an embedded sentence or rather, more accurately, a tenseless, 
aspectless, modal-less proposition. For example, 'order' implies an 
orderer, somebody who is ordered, and something (a proposition) that 
is ordered. Macaulay (1968) and Ross (1970) claim in this connection 
that the orderer must be 'I', and the person ordered 'you' when the 
verb is used performatively. This point will be discussed presently.
Verbs that are nominalised with 'make', however, are often 
not associated with three roles in the same way. For example,
'judge*, 'deduce', 'assume' in the sentences:
a) I judge that the prisoner is guilty
l) b) I deduce that it is not true
c) I assume that he is a liar 
do not have 'you' associated with them in the same way as 'order* 
above or, indeed, as other verbs in the A) list such as 'promise' or 
' suggest*.
A further observation about verbs in group A) is that when 
they are nominalised with 'make* they take an indirect object together 
with the preposition*to*i.e. the personal noun or pronoun with which 
they are associated is in the Dative case* We earlier said about 
'make' that it was a verb that appeared in the Cf-produce verb —
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F frame, where the F could be developed as either a N.P, or a
proposition. Under these circumstances it is not possible for the
verb 'make1 or indeed any other 'produce verb' to take a noun in the 
D case. Any personal noun or pronoun in an associated role will 
appear, rather, in Fillmore's B case - the benefactive - as illustrated 
in the following:
2) a) I made a cake for Mary
b) They built a bridge for the local council.
However, it is quite possible to say
3) a) I make a promise to you
b) I make a suggestion to you.
Though, the above suggests that'make’is not being used in an 
exactly parallel way in 3) as it is in 2), the remarkable consistency 
with which performative verbs can be nominalised with the dummy verbs 
'make' and 'give', verbs to which, not only the previous analysis, 
but many linguists would give a causative interpretation, strongly 
suggests that performative verbs, too, should be given this 
interpretation•
So far we have identified two types of causative lerb; those 
that fit the frame C.’_F and have the class meaning 'produce' and those 
that fit the C_ AF frame and have the class meaning1 change.' The 
question then arises as to what the class meaning is of performative 
verbs. Although Austin does not express himself in these terms, it 
is fair to say that what Austin"s* proposals amount to is that the 
class meaning of performative verbs is what he terms illocutionary 
force. He says, for example (op. cit. p.103) that the illocutionary 
act, i.e. the uttering of a statement with illocutionary force "is said 
to be conventional, in the sense that at least it could be made 
explicit by the performative formula." When any utterance is made, 
moreover, he claims, there are two elements that can be abstracted, 
two things that we are responsible for, illocutionary and loeutionary
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acts.
We could express this in terms of our theory hy saying that the
first rule of our grammar could be expressed in the follov/ing manner,
S — ^ e: + illocutionary force vb (D) + S' . We will return
to a discussion of the implications of this rule in a moment.
Performatives and Modality.
Boyd and Thorne (1969) have tried to relate illocutionary force 
to the modals. In their own Words they "treat the modal verbs as 
indicating the illocutionary potential of the sentences in which they 
occur." (p.62),
There is certainly something to be said for this proposal.
In order to examine it more closely, however, certain distinctions 
need to be made. There is, first of all, the distinction between 
imperative and non-imperative modal related performatives.
The only non-imperative performative with a corresponding modal 
appears to be 'predict'. (see Boyd <& Thorne op. cit, pp,62-65), i.e* 
the distinction between
4) a) The train leaves at 7*00.
and b) The train will leave at 7*00,
Is that the latter is to be interpreted in terms of the illocutionary 
force associated with the performative "I predict", while the former 
is not.
Among imperative performatives that can be related to modals 
there are at least three different classes.
a) Strong imperatives
(i) order or command, e.g.
I order you to read. You must read
(ii) suggest or advise, e.g.
I suggest that you read You should read or you ought to read.
b) Weak imperatives. These correspond to Leech's
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class of verbs that express weak causation (op. cit. p.208). Leech 
compares the verbs ’make1 and ’compel’ with ’let* and ’allow’ in this 
connection. For example, if we compare the two sentences
I have made him go 
and I have allowed him to go 
it is evident that while the former implies that he has gone, the 
latter does not imply it in the same strong way, but only that I have 
supplied the necessary conditions for his’going, and that if he wishes 
to avail himself of the opportunity thus provided, he may do so.
Examples of modal related weak imperatives are permit or allow, e.g. 
I allow/permit you to read You may read or you can read,
c) Reflexive imperatives 
I interpret the performatives ’promise1 and ’vow' as being of this 
type. What characterises these verbs is that when they are used 
performatively they are similar to the strong imperatives in that 
they publicly assert an obligationj the difference being that the 
person obliged to a course of action is the person who speaks. These 
verbs are related to the raodals 'shall* and 'will', e.g.
I promise to read I shall read or I will read,
although 'I will read' may, of course, also be interpreted as a
prediction.
However, not all modal verbs can be explained as being the 
result of the 'infusing' of the illocutionary force associated with 
particular performatives into an associated sentence, thus casting 
doubt on the theory that modality is to be identified with illocutionary 
force
Firstly, there seem to be no performative equivalents to such 
sentences as the following
a) There must be a thousand people here.
5) b) It may rain tomorrow.
c) The train should be arriving at 10.00.
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The modals ’must':?, 'may* and 'should’ in these sentences are clearly 
not related to 'order', 'permit* and 'advise' respectively, as viere 
the previous examples containing these modals. Nor is this sinply a 
question of deixis, the follovfing modal sentences with you as subject 
are also not open to this interpretation*
a) Xou must he hungry, (said to someone after a long
walk)•
6) b) You may be luchy.
c) You should get a good job, (said to a graduate
worried about employment prospects),
Y/hat seems to determine the choice of modal in the frame.
You - modal - get a good job, said in circumstances like the
above is the degree of certainty felt by the speaker. We can set up 
the following rough correspondences,
I say, with certainty, you get a good job. You must get a good job,
X say, with probability, you get a good job, 0^=- You should/ought 
to get a good job,
I say, with possibility, you get a good job. "=0=- You may/might/cap/could 
get a good job.
The conditions for selecting one modal of this type rather 
than other are broadly similar to those involved in the selection of 
one intellectual parenthetical rather than another. Indeed, already 
in Gh.l p. we pointed out the similarity between some sentence adverbials, 
some parentheticals and some modal verbs in the way they asserted or 
modified the certainty felt by the speaker with regard to the truth 
and reasonableness of the statement with which they are associated.
However, intellectual parenthetical verbs have already been shown to 
be *resultatives' rather than causatives, related to 'have* rather than 
'give' or 'make', implying varying degrees of reliability of the 
evidence that backs up a statement. The situation seems the same
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when it comes to selecting one non-performative related modal rather 
than another. Although the individual is responsible for saying that 
a certain statement is possible rather than certain by the use of 
1 think1 rather than 'know1, or 'may' rather tha& 'must1, for example, 
the cause of the use of one rather than another is not the authority 
or social position of the individual himself, at that moment, as it is 
with the performative related modals,- but the amount of evidence that 
the speaker has at his disposal and to which he must refer if asked to 
justify himself.
We seem to be led to the conclusion, therefore, that modals 
are to be derived from two sources a causative performative source and 
a resultative source which is also involved in the selection of 
certain sentence adverbials and intellectual parentheticals, though 
the formulation of this must await a more detailed study of modality. 
Finally it should be noted that the term 'modality' as used 
in this section is not to be equated with the term as it is used by 
Fillmore. Fillmore's modality component contains a great dead more 
i.e. tense aspect, etc. in addition to the type of modality we have 
been discussing in this chapter.
Performatives, deixis and 1 say'.
McCawley (1968) and Ross' (1970) make the point that the person 
of the subject and the indirect object (i.e. the Dative) are 
predictable when a verb is used performatively, i.e. in
7) I promise you £1,
'promise' is used performatively, whereas in
8) He promises me £1,
'promise' is not'a performative but is rather a report of a performative. 
Thus 'I verb (in the present tense, with a non-habitual instantaneous 
interpretation,) you', is a necessary though not of course a sufficient 
condition for the existence of the performative use. M&Cawley, 
therefore, proposes to define the notion first and second person 
"so that person specification need not appear in deep structure at 
all. One undifferentiated personal pronoun will become specified for 
person on the basis of its index and the indices of the subject and 
indirect object of the performative", (op. cit.; p.158) •
However, we have already pointed out that some verbs, generally 
considered performatives, do not have 'you' normally associated with 
them. Consider
9) a) I name this ship Brittania.
b) I judge the prisoner to be guilty.
In these instances the only sense in which 'you* is present in the 
meaning or deep structure of the sentence is a result of the fact 
that sentences are not usually spoken for our own benefit, but for 
the benefit of a listener a 'you* .
Ross (1970) touches upon this point in relation to a discussion 
of the relative merits of a pragmatic or perforaiative analysis. He 
is concerned to explain the occurrence of 'myself* in such sentences as
10) As for myself I promise I will be -there.
He says* "The problem is how can the pronoun myself be
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generated since [the above sentence] can be a performative sentence 
it cannot be argued that there is a higher performative verb of saying, 
for performative verbs cannot be embedded, as was pointed out in 
connection with 101." (op. cit. p.255).
This latter was a sentence designed to illustrate the impossibility 
of the embedding of performatives, namely,
11)* I admit that I hereby promise that I1 IX be late.
This argument assumes,, however, that * say' is a performative,
an assumption that seems dubious on many grounds.
Firstly, there is the point that 1 say1 cannot be nominalised 
with either the verb ‘make* or 'give1 acting as a dummy verb* We do 
not make or give a saying* Note that while the same is true of 'tell'
it is not true of' state' or’affirm.* These verbs are often considered 
identical by linguists when they discuss-performatives (see Boyd & Thorne 
op* cit. and Ross= op. cit.). This is clearly untrue, however, as can 
be seen from the sentence,
12) a) He affirmed/stated "Ohl.,/nDamnV.H/keally,#’t which 
is clearly unacceptable outside (and probably inside) a police-station 
or court-room, and
12) b) He said, "OhV"/Bamn'."/Really
which is quite normal.
Secondly, while Ross is correct in arguing that performative 
sentences cannot be embedded, the following sentences seem quite 
acceptable^ '
a) I say (to you) that X promise you £1.
13) b) I say (to you) that I order you to go.
c) I say (to you) that I judge the prisoner guilty.
Compare the inadmissibility of the above sentences should Vbate1 
or 'affirm*replace Ysayj
The situation is even clearer when we consider reported speech*
Compare
a) I said (to him) that I promised him £1.
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lif) b) I said (to him) that I ordered him to go*
o) I told (him) that I judged the prisoner guilty,
with
a)* I affirmed (to him) that I promised him £1
15) To)*4* I stated that I ordered him to go.
o)^  I admitted that 1 judged the prisoner guilty.
Thirdly, it is not surprising that there is an element of 
imps/tie nee or redundancy present when sentences such as 13) above are 
uttered or that ' say* is the most commonly used verb of reported speech. 
Say is a verb without illocutionary force, because it can be associated 
with any and every utterance*. We could, alternatively, express the 
above by saying that * say' is the unmarked verb of linguistic 
communication* Every sentence analysed by a linguist will have 1 say1 
in its deep structure because linguistics is the study of what is said.
The fact that many performative verbs do not have 'you1 
associated with them and that the speech situation, typically, involves 
a speaker (i) and a person spoken to i.e, ’you1, suggests that the 
valuable and intuitively satisfying deictic observations of McCawley, 
noted above, be incorporated into linguistic theoiy by an amendment 
of the first rule of the grammar, already suggested, (p* 101 above) 
thus:
S--- > G + say + D + S’
C:--- > I
 > You.
I have avoided the issue as to whether S’ should be considered
a factitive or effected type of result as this is somewhat speculative* 
However, to say something could be interpreted as either, or indeed 
both, causing a sentence to be or causing somebody to hear a sentence.
The verb ’tell* can be substituted for say in many contexts 
though its usage is more restricted, e.g. it could not appear in 
sentences like 12) above and the associated Dative must be present in
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the surface structure, whereas with 'say1 its presence is not 
obligatory. We have, incidentally, already considered 'tell' as an 
intellectual perlocutionaiy, in our analysis, related to the 
intellectual parenthetical 1 hear' .
More ora imperatives* and modality.
Now that we have abolished the rule stating that performatives 
are always associated with the Dative 'you* but that 'you' is rather 
associated with the unmarked verb of linguistic communication 'say', 
let us examine the implications of this for the imperative performatives 
and their associated modals*
McCawley (op. cit. p*156) implies that the subject of the 
embedded sentence of an imperative performative vd.ll always be 'you*. 
This we have, of course, already denied in analysing 'promise1 as; a 
reflexive imperative performative, so that the subject of the embedded 
sentence is frequently I. This accounts for the different reflexive 
pronouns in the sentences
However, the imperative type modals that we have so far only 
considered with 'you* as subject are also quite clearly capable of an 
interpretation as imperatives when the subject is not 'you' *
Consider the sentences
said, for example, by an employer to a foreman about an employee*
In terms of our analysis the deep structure of such sentences 
would be roughly the following;
16) a) I advise you to enjoy yourself
b) I promise (you) to enjoy myself.
a) (must )
1
17) b) He > go on holiday.
0)
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a) ( order )
( )
18) b) I say to you that I ^ advise j him to go on holiday
c) ( allow )
It is quite clear that the modals in 17) are to be given an 
imperative interpretation, i.e. they are not similar to the modals 
exemplified in 5) and 6) above. It also seems true, however, that
a) ( order )
19) b) I | advise, j him to go on holiday
c) ( allow )
should also be taken as exemplifying a performative use of the verbs 
•order1, ’advise', and ’allow’* They pass the following tests£
a) In 19) the speaker is not describing anything, but 
rather doing something, giving an order, advice or permission.
b) Used with progressive aspect this is no longer 
true, the speaker is describing what he is doing, and not doing 
anything,
c) Associated with adverbs of frequency such as; 
•always’, or when simply interpreted as being, in what Leech calls 
the habitual rather than instantaneous present, the speaker is again 
describing rather than doing anything.
d) It is possible to use the characteristic 
performative adverbial ’hereby* in association with 19)*
The imperative element may be removed one further stage from 
what we may, of course, still regard as its fundamental use, where 
•you' is the subject of an embedded sentence of an imperative 
performative. This is exemplified by the following sentences and 
circumstances,
20) a) He must leave the meeting (said at the time of the 
forcible ejection of a demonstrator by a policeman).
20) b) He can stay (said when the policeman relents).
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20) c) He should give up smoking (said when reporting a 
doctor's advice).
The above sentences although containing an imperative in their 
deep structure are not performative, but are reports of another's 
performative, and are to be analysed in something like the following 
manner.
a) (order ) he leava
( )
21) b) I say to you that somebody (advise) he give up smoking
c) [permit) he stay.
Even under these circumstances, hovrever, the ’must’, 'should* 
and 'can* or 'may', related to imperative performatives, is to be 
distinguished from the toust*, 'should' and 'can* exemplified in 5) and
6) above.
Imperatives are best considered as normally operating on a 
tenseless aspectless propositional component.
22) a)* Be reading a book
b)* Be cleaning your teeth
are deviant unless a clause such as 'when I return1 is added, and there 
is no possible interpretation for sentences such as;
a)* Read a book yesterday.
23) b* You must read a book yesterday.
or c)t;< You must have read a book yestex’day,
in an imperative sense.
The same constraints do not hold for the modals illustrated in
3) and 6) above, that are related to the intellectual parentheticals 
and that should be regarded as operating on a sentential rather than 
a propositional component.
Compare the following sentences:
2A) You must read Shakespeare 
which can be understood as either an imperative, or as a statement 
made because, e.g. a conversation interspersed with frequent
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Shakespearian quotations has convinced the speaker that it is true.
25) a) You must be reading Shakespeare
or b) You must have read Shakespeare
cannot be understood as imperatives, however.
Similarly, while,
26) You may read Shakespeare
is ambiguous between the interpretation involving permission and 
that involving possibility (for example, when imagining a future 
university course);
27) a) You may be reading Shakespeare
is not ambiguous, and can only be interpreted in the possibility 
sense as can
27) b) You may have read Shakespeare.
1 Should1 is not so neatly interpretable in this way. Indeed 
the semantics of 1 should* is more complex than the analysis given 
above indicates, as Boyd and Thorne help to indicate (op. cit. pp.66-67).
However, the relationship between some causative performatives 
and some imperative-type modals, and that between some parentheticals 
and some non-imperative-type modals, is^ also evident from a 
consideration of negation. Compare the following pairs of sentences, 
where *1 say to you + certainty* is taken to be equivalent to *1 know*
and *1 say to you 4- possibility* to be equivalent to *1 think*:
28) a) I 4* order + D -t- prop = e.g.
He must study at university,
b) I say to you 4- certainty + sent = e.g.
He must (be) study(ing) at university,
29) a) I + order 4- D + not + prop = e.g.
He must not study at university,
b) I say to you + certainty + not + sent, = e.g.
He cannot (be) study(ing) at university.
30) a) I -i- not .+ order + D + prop e.g.
He needn’t study at university,
b) 1 say to you + not + certainty + sent. = e.g.
He may not (be) study(ing) at university.
The facts that 30) b) is related to 31) J
31) I say to you + possibility + sent. = e.g.
He may not (be) study(ing) at university
and that 29) a) is related to 32);
32) I + not + permit + D + prop = e.g.
He cannot/may not study at university
can be partly explained, at least, by a consideration of.the followin 
points* Firstly, necessity is related to possibility in what Leech 
calls an inversion system, (see Leech, op. cit. especially pp. 55-56 
and pp~.204-205) i.e. possible = not necessary and not possible = 
necessary not* Secondly, it seems probable that the imperative 
modals are also to be ultimately analysed as containing the same 
semantic elements of necessity possibility (and probability ?) as 
their non-inperative counterparts.
However, consideration of such factors would lead to a much 
more detailed analysis of modality than there is spare for here.
The proposals made by Leech (op. cit. Gh.9) and Seuren (op. Cit. 
pp.156-161) are of relevance*
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In this section we have been concerned with performative verbs 
and also, subsidiarily, with the imperative sentences and modals to 
which they can be shown to be related. Before leaving this section, 
therefore, two questions of relevance to our general theme should be 
answered*
Firstly, why is it that performative verbs do not take progressive 
apsect when used performatively ? The performative use of verbs seems 
to be a clear case of what Leech calls the instantaneous present, the 
•single - event - now' use, (op, cit. p.139)* As we saw above (p. 17 ),
Leech points out that one of the effects progressive aspect has is 
to "psychologically extend the time span of the instantaneous present." 
This is clearly true in the case of the performatives. For example, 
while in:
33) 1 promise that I will see him.
M  promise1 is the performance of an act of promising at that moment; 
in
34) I am promising that I will see him
•I am promising' is to be interpreted as a report of activity in 
progress of which 34) itself is part.
Secondly,why is it that stative verbs cannot be used in 
imperative constructions ? We have seen that an imperative performative 
is associated with two noun phrases: the noun phrase that is part of
the performative component and which is the indirect object of the 
performative verb (i.e. in the D case), and the noun phrase that is 
the subject of the associated tenseless aspectlessi proposition.
Although the second noun phrase must have the same index as the first 
(unless it is a reflexive inperative, i.e. a promise), it must not be 
in the same case. It seems essential, indeed, that the subject of 
the propositional component be dominated by the C or A node in this 
instance. Moreover, under normal circumstances the subject of the 
propositional component will be human, or at least animate, in an
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imperative construction. Thus, although we have not specified the 
cases of the N.F's that are normally animate and can occur under the 
domination of the ,AF node, i.e. the case of John in
John is tall 
and John is in the garden, 
it is clear that John is not dominated "by G or A in these instances, 
and that this is also true when N.P.'s are associated with copula-like 
verbs. Y/ith verbs like 'have1 and 'know', we have already seen that 
the noun must be in the D case.
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PART 5
FURTHER QUESTIONS
116.
CHAPTER 17
Emotional parenthetioals.and verbs of sensation
There are many other types of stative verb that v*e have no opportunity 
to loolc at in any detail in a brief study like this. Among them are the 
'emotional parenthetioals,* verbs of liking etc. and verbs of sensation.
The emotional parenthetioals are, like the Intellectual parenthetioals, 
resultatives, i.e. they are to be interpreted as being introduced under the 
Af node and associated with a noun in the D case. As intellectual 
parenthetioals are related to intellectual causatives ~ the perlocutionaries - 
so are emotional parenthetioals related to causatives such as sadden, gladden 
etc. The difference, however, is that now it is the sentence itself or more 
accurately the event to which the sentence refers that is the causative agent, 
and not, as in the case of convince etc., a human agent or 'the evidence,' 
Compares
1) Charles/ the evidence has convinced me that your son is dead, 
and 2) (The fact) that your son is dead has saddened me.
However, as we have shown is always the case with causative verbs, the 
result of the passive transformation on the above is either
3) a) I have been saddened
b) I am saddened
which can be paraphrased by
4) a) I regret
b) I am sad
Progressive aspect again cannot be used because this would make it the 
equivalent ofs
5) That your son is dead is saddening me,
which states that a process of change is in existence, but that the result has 
not been reached. Verbs like 'regret* or 'rejoice', however, have the function 
of indicating that a result has been reached at some time in the past and is
still in existence*
that your son is dead.
that your son is dead.
by going to the cinema
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Many linguists have pointed out that ’like* is related to the causative 
'please* and some such as Fillmore have pointed out that this implies that 
the surface structure subject of like should, therefore, be in the Dative 
(1968 P.30). There are, however, problems in treating 'like* in a parallel 
way to the emotional parenthetioals, although it could be argued that,
6) Going to the cinema has pleased me 
is related to
7) a) I have been pleased
b) I am pleased
and that this is a rough equivalent of
8) I like going to the cinema.
(cf sentences 2) - 4) above.)
Verbs of sensation are rather a special case. However, they too are 
related to causatives. For example 'see1 is not only related to 'look' and 
'look at* as Palmer points out (see p.22 above) but also to 'show* which 
has sometimes been analysed as 'cause to see'.. Similarly to play music 
to somebody could be interpreted as causing somebody to hear music.
However 'show' does not mean 'to cause to see* so much as to 'enable to 
see,* i.e.. we have here an instance of weak rather than strong causation 
(see above p.102). Strong causaion would be better expressed by 'to make 
somebody look at.' Thus, just as
9) a) 1 let him go 
implies he could go.
b) I showed him it 
implies he could see it.
It is in this way that the existence of 'can* in association with 
verbs of sensation is to be explained. Boyd and Thorne (1969 p*72) 
have recently revived an idea of Hornby's, (1953 p.228) that 'can* is 
used with verbs of sensation as a substitute for progressive aspect.
This seems true in so far as
10) I am showing Jim the film
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would seem to'imply that Jim's process (or whatever) of seeing the film is 
going on now. My suggestion is that both the above proposals are true and 
that
11) I am being shown the film, 
which can now be interpreted as,
12) I am being enabled to see the film, 
is roughly the equivalent of
13) I can see the film.
in a similar way to which *1 am convinced* is roughly the equivalent of 'I know'.
It should be noted that the above account implies that the aspectual 
characteristics of we ale causative verbs, when operated upon by the passive 
transformation is similar to that of basic transitives and not strong 
causatives, i.e.
14) I have shown him the picture. 
is related to
15) He has been shown the picture, 
but not to
16) He is shown the picture.
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CHAPTER. 18 
The Benefactive
Fillmore (1968) fails to discuss the benefactive in any detail apart 
from stating that it characteristically has the preposition 'for* associated 
with it. However, the name of the case suggests that he would probably 
define it as the case of the person or object that would benefit as the 
result of the action identified by the verb, and it can be exemplified by 
such sentences as:
1) I painted the picture for Peter.
2) I bought the curtains for the bedroom.
We have so far referred to it only as the case of the Noun phrase that
tends to occur after a noun in the Factitive case (cf 1) above and P.100 above).
It is interesting to contemplate the possibility that B too is a 
semantic slot capable of being filled by syntactic elements other than N.P* s, 
like C., F. and Af. I think that there is evidence to show that embedding 
can take place under the B. node, i.e. that nouns in the B. case are a sub-set 
of the class of possible syntactic elements, that can fill the B. slot.
While nouns in the B. case are the answer to implied questions of the
form
3) Who did you do it for?
e.g. for Peter in 1) above, English has another question that contains the 
prepos it ion 1 for,1 namely,
4) What did you do it for?
The answer to this question can take many forms, among the most common 
of which are sentences that appear to include an infinitive form of the verb 
and sentences that include what we have hitherto followed Leech in calling the 
'causative conjunction* because. That is, in answer to questions such as,
5) What did you cometo England for? 
we could give the answer,
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6) a) To learn English.
b) Because I wanted to learn English.
However, while 'why* questions can always be substituted for 'what - for* 
questions the reverse does not hold. For example,
7) a)K What is it raining for?
b)H What does oil float on water for? 
are the questions of children or the scientifically unsophisticated.
Similarly, while
8) Why did the chair break? 
can be answered by, e.g.
9) Because John broke it, 
there is no answer to
10)K What did the chair break for? 
though the question
11) What did John break the chair for? 
can be answered by, e.g.
12) a) To annoy his father,
or b) Because he wanted to annoy his father.
What - for questions are, in fact, used to question human, or at least 
animate purposes. The answers to them give the reasons for, rather than the 
causes of, actions. Thus it is a mistake to call 'because' a causative 
conjunction, as it can not onHy be used to link actions (or rather changes) to 
their causes as in 9) above, but also to give reasons for an action as in 12) b).
'Who - for' questions also question animate purposes as Fillmore notes 
when he suggests that "the occurrence of B. phrases has more to do with 
whether the sentence contains an A." (op cit P.87) rather than with anything 
else. Peter is in fact the reason for the painting of the picture in l) above.
There is also evidence to suggest that the propositional elements 
introduced by 'to*, exemplified by 6) a) and 12) a) above, should also contain 
the preposition 'for' in the deep structure. This can be seen in sentences
121*
where the benefit accruing from an activitjr is not that of the subject of the 
main sentence but somebody else1s, e.g*
13) We went to the 200 for the children to see the lions*
Compare with this:
14-} We went to the zoo to see the lions*
It could be argued that the best way to account fox'* the existence of * for* in
13) but not in IU;.) is to assume that 1 for* is present in the deep structure of 
both sentences, but that the same transformation that deletes the N.P* that is
the subject of the embedded proposition by the equi-N.P. deletion rule, is also
r
responsible for the deletion of the underlying preposition ‘for*. That is, we 
assume that at some stage of its derivation 14} above would look something 
like
13)32 We went to the zoo for us to see the lions.
There is also the fact that ‘for - to* was used to express purpose or 
the reason for an action in older English and is still used today, in son© 
dialects, e.g,
16) We went to the zoo for to see the lions.
A word that is normally translated as ‘for* would be used, moreover, in
the French and Welsh translations of the sentence ‘I went to see the Queen,1
17) Je suis alle pour voir la reine,
18) Euthum i jam weld y Frenhines*
Even more striking evidence comes from a consideration of the words for 
‘why1 and ‘because* in languages other than English. With regard to ‘why,* in 
addition to modern English * what for*, we have the now archaic form * wherefore* 
which is clearly related to the modern German ‘wofUr*. Then there are 
examples from the Slavic languages^  Polish — ‘dlaczego* and Serbo-Croat - 
’ zasto*, both literally ‘for what* and the Czech — ‘proc* historically derived 
from a form that could be translated in the same way. In addition there is 
the French ‘pourquoi* and the Welsh ‘patiam*, meaning literally ‘for what’ and
‘what for1 respectively. Similarly, a word that is usually translated as ‘for’ f
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forms part of the word that is the translation equivalent of ’because1 in 
such languages as the followings Polish - ’ dlatego*; Serbo-Croat 'jsato*;
The evidence of the above strongly suggests that embedded sentences of 
*reasons 1 introduced by ’because’ , and embedded propositions of ’reason* 
introduced by (for) to, are related to, what Fillmore calls, noun phrases in 
the B, case, which have the preposition ’for’ characteristically associated 
with them. This can best be expressed by postulating a further semantic slot, 
this time R, (for reason), that is optionally connected with sentences that 
contain an A. or a C., and which can be developed by the rules
Czech - ’protoze’ *, Italian — ’perche’, etc.
( N.P. )
R. — ■ ■)
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